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Benjamin Liebman* & Tim Wu**

INTRODUCTION
China’s internet revolution has set off a furious debate in the West.
Optimists from Thomas Friedman to Bill Clinton have predicted the crumbling of
the Chinese Party-state, while pessimists suggest even greater state control. But a
far less discussed and researched subject is the effect of China’s internet
revolution on its domestic institutions. This article, the product of extensive
interviews across China, asks a new and different question. What has China’s
internet revolution meant for its legal system? What does cheaper if not free
speech mean for Chinese judges?
The broader goal of this article is to better understand the relationship
between how a legal system functions and how judges communicate, both with
each other and with other parties, including the media, public, and political actors.
Information transmission is an important but poorly understood part of any legal
system. A precedent system, amicus briefs, and the rules on ex parte contacts all
serve to regulate how parties in a system communicate, and what kind of
information “counts.” Media and political pressure cannot help but affect a legal
system. The underlying premise is that the speech system surrounding the
judiciary matters, and affects how judges decide cases.
The People’s Republic of China stands as a nearly ideal case to understand
these more general questions. Over the last fifteen years the Chinese legal system
has undergone important transformations in the costs and means of disseminating
information -- the consequence both of new technologies and of the
commercialization of the Chinese media during the same period. This has led to
changes in both the information available to judges and the attention paid to the
judiciary’s decisions. Such changes have come precisely as the Chinese courts
are undergoing dramatic reforms, whose stated aim is to make courts more
competent, fair, and authoritative actors in the Chinese political system.
*

Associate Professor and Director, Center for Chinese Legal Studies, Columbia Law School.
Professor, Columbia Law School, Center for Chinese Legal Studies. We are grateful for
comments from participants in a seminar hosted by the Institute of Law of the Chinese Academy
of Social Sciences, and in the Columbia Law School Junior Faculty Workshop. We are indebted
to Hu Jianjie, Peng Lingyan, Yang Fuhao, Zhang Lan, and Zhang Wenguang for outstanding
research assistance.
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An optimistic free speech theory suggests that greater exposure to
information and ease of communications will be an unmitigated good for a legal
system. In the broader internet context, writers like Yochai Benkler, Eugene
Volokh and Glenn Reynolds have argued that cheaper mass communications
technology will improve government and lead to healthier political systems.1 As
Benkler writes, “we are [now] witnessing a fundamental change in how
individuals can interact with their democracy and experience their role as
citizens.”
Our study of the Chinese judiciary 2 uncovers evidence to support the
optimistic theory -- exciting examples of internet pressure that have uncovered
injustice and forced courts and Communist Party officials to take action. But
overall we find a mixed picture that includes both optimistic, headline-grabbing
stories and decidedly more ambiguous developments.
We present two groups of findings. The first, under the heading Net
Justice, are developments in communications between the judiciary and the media,
public, and the Communist Party officials who oversee both the courts and the
media. The media and the public’s new ease in finding out what judges are doing
has already clearly had important benefits. In cases such as that of Sun Zhigang -a university graduate brutally murdered in a detention center for migrant workers3
-- it is clear that internet and media pressure led to both judicial action and
salutary institutional reform. But the flip side is the use of the internet to
generate extreme public pressure and consequent political intervention in reaction
to certain types of inflammatory cases. That is, of course, not an entirely new
development. The Chinese legal system has long been characterized by Partystate intervention in important or sensitive cases. The difference is the rise of
cases where public reaction and outrage online leads officials to intervene and
predetermine or change judicial action. In one of the examples discussed below,
internet pressure resulted in a convicted gangster, Liu Yong, having his life
sentence reversed, and being swiftly put to death. The same efficiencies of
communication that make exposing unfair or unjust decisions easier also facilitate,
and make more likely, public pressure and political intervention.
The second set of findings is developments in Judicial Networks, or the
communications patterns among judges. There are signs of important changes in
how Chinese judges communicate with each other. Chinese judges have
traditionally made decisions based on consultation that is mostly vertical— with
“adjudication committees” that resolve difficult or sensitive cases within a court,
with court presidents, with Communist Party Political-Legal Committees, and
with higher courts. Judges have had limited abilities to consult with other
1

YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS (2006); GLENN REYNOLDS, AN ARMY OF
DAVIDS (2006); see also Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L. J. 1805
(1995).
2
In China, references to “the judiciary” and “judicial” encompass both the courts and the
procuratorates. In this article, we use “judiciary” and “judicial” to refer to the courts alone.
3
See infra Part II.
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members of the judiciary outside their court, other than those in directly superior
courts, and sometimes have had limited access to relevant laws and other legal
materials. Today, much is changing, particularly through use of the internet and
other communications technologies. Chinese judges increasingly communicate
and consult along horizontal lines, with other judges, and also with academics and
the public. Many judges use the internet from home or web cafes to do extra
research, finding either Chinese or foreign cases. Judges report an emerging and
informal system of quasi-precedent made possible by horizontal networking.
Judges’ decisions are also much better publicized through a variety of means,
including the internet, and as a result are subject to more external criticism.
Finally, in Innovative Uses, our study shows that some Chinese judges
have begun use to the internet as a judicial tool in ways that are unusual and
perhaps unprecedented in other parts of the world. For example, some judges use
chat rooms and email in the course of deciding hard cases, communicating with
other judges, academics, and even the public. Other judges and courts maintain
blogs that comment on cases, and make their case decisions available to the public
and other judges. These types of behavior are relatively unique and may lead to
distinctly Chinese judicial communications practices.
***
The study of the China’s judiciary yields important and general insights
into the poorly understood relationship between judicial power and judicial
speech. As generations of American scholars have suggested, the power of the
judiciary to act independently from other branches depends on the availability and
acceptability of higher principles to which judges may appeal. Whether Herbert
Wechsler’s “neutral principles” or the appeals to tradition or accepted moral
doctrine contemplated by others, 4 the degree to which society and other
government actors accept the principles to which judges appeal does much to
determine the judiciary’s power.
Changes in the costs and means of communication in a society can affect
the ability of judges to make claims to legitimacy. The major examples are
through access to the laws themselves, and through the ease of forming judicial
networks. As horizontal, judge-to-judge communications become easier and
cheaper, judges can make new claims to the authority to decide cases according to
cases already decided. Networked judges, like common-law judges, also gain the
ability to learn from other judges. 5 The development of horizontal judicial
networking may be an crucial means for strengthening the autonomy and
professional identity of courts.

4

See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1959); ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
5
See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER, ch. 2 (2004) (describing global
trend toward judicial networking).
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But there’s a flip side, for cheap communications also make it easier to
attack the judiciary and diminish its legitimacy. In the China example we see an
extreme version -- the “internet manhunt” leading to political intervention -- with
important lessons for the rest of the world. The dominant writing on internet
criticism in the United States stresses improvements in government and media
accountability. Yet not all criticism is socially useful, and when criticism is used
as a political weapon against an already weak judiciary it does not improve
governance but endangers progress toward a rule of law system. At its worst, and
when supported by the state, cheap mass criticism can lead to judges unwilling to
make decisions that run the risk of inflaming the public, and a surrender of
judicial authority to the vicissitudes of public opinion.
***
The paper is divided into three parts. Part I introduces theoretical
background on the relationship between communications technologies,
government, and judicial behavior. Part II is a study of the Chinese judiciary.
Part III discusses the relationship between speech and judicial legitimacy.
I. SPEECH AND INFORMATION IN A LEGAL SYSTEM
A. Free Speech, Information, and Government
Since the early 20th century the relationship among communications
technologies, government, and free speech has been a field of intense interest. The
rise of the telegraph, telephone, and the mass media of the 20th century led
writers from Charles Cooley through Wilbur Schramm and Marshall McCullen to
forecast great changes in human governance. 6
This is the field of
“communications studies” of the 20th century, which in its earliest days tended to
optimism. Writers such as Charles Cooley wrote with moving confidence that
technologies such as the telegraph might “make it possible for society to be
organized more and more on the higher faculties of man, on intelligence and
sympathy, rather than authority, caste, and routine.”7 These ideas reflected both a
faith in technological progress and the more general belief in the power of free
speech to improve society embodied in the American First Amendment.
One hundred years later, the optimism of the early 1900s was reborn
during the internet revolution of the 1990s. Consistent with the American free
speech tradition the writing is mostly buoyant. It suggests, with a few exceptions,
that cheaper speech will yield a more participatory democratic culture, more
attention to public opinion, and generally better and more responsive governments.
6

The field of early communications studies is far too vast to describe here. For an introduction,
see WILBUR LANG SCHRAMM, THE BEGINNINGS OF COMMUNICATION STUDY IN AMERICA: A
PERSONAL MEMOIR (1997).
7
CHARLES HORTON COOLEY, ON SELF AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 103 (1963).
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One stream of writing centers on the governance processes of the internet
itself, and how they might form a model for the “real world.” The internet has
been, since its inception, loosely governed by an informal management process
dominated by technocratic engineers. In Paulina Borsook’s 1995 Wired piece,
“How Anarchy Works,”8 she described internet governance as the “kind of direct,
populist democracy that most of us have never experienced.” The engineers were
“the masters of the metaverse” engaged in “a radical social experiment.” The
thesis was that the internet’s founding engineers hadn’t just built a good network,
but had solved certain intractable problems of human governance along the way.
Since the 1990s many have doubted whether internet governance serves as
a plausible model for purposes other than technical standard-setting. The 2006
book Who Controls the Internet (co-authored by one of us) questioned the
viability of government structures that lack access to physical coercion.9 Notably,
since the 1990s, few areas of government have successfully mimicked the
“working anarchy” of the early internet. Instead the self-governance structures on
the internet have turned to territorial government for assistance. The internet, in
turn, has increasingly become subject to the power of nation-state governments.10
In the 2000s, a new body of scholarship promoted the possibilities of
internet-communications for improving the nature of national deliberation, in
particular by supplementing or replacing traditional media as the primary source
of scrutiny of government. One of the first to present what we can now call
“blogger theory” was Professor Eugene Volokh, in Cheap Speech and What It
Will Do.11 Yochai Benkler presented a full treatment of this thesis in his book,
The Wealth of Networks,12 as did writer Dan Gilmour in We the Media13 and law
professor and blogger Glenn Reynolds in An Army of Davids.14
These authors present an attractive thesis: in a country where every citizen
has the means to act as a critic, the result will be a more responsive government.
Roughly the idea is that the marketplace of ideas has been hindered by barriers to
market entry. The high costs of communications have stood in the way of regular
citizens participating in political discourse, leaving participation to specialized
entities such as professional interest groups and the professional media. But
since the 1990s, the decreased costs of communication made possible by
technological changes have facilitated greater access to the political process,
making it possible for amateurs and regular citizens to be involved. As Benkler
writes, the rise of the internet has “fundamentally altered the capacity of
individuals, acting alone or with others, to be active participants in the public
8

Paulina Borsook, How Anarchy Works: On Location with the Masters of the Metaverse, the
Oct.
1995,
available
at
Internet
Engineering
Task
Force,
WIRED,
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/3.10/ietf.html.
9
See generally, TIM WU & JACK GOLDSMITH, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET, ch. 2,3 & 10 (2006).
10
See generally, id.
11
104 YALE L.J. 1805 (1995).
12
YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 212-272 (2006).
13
DAN GILMOUR, WE THE MEDIA (2004).
14
GLENN REYNOLDS, AN ARMY OF DAVIDS (2006).
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sphere as opposed to its passive readers, listeners, or viewers . . . . It is in this
sense that the Internet democratizes.”15
The dissent from this view has come in clearest form from Professor Cass
Sunstein in his books Republic.com and Echo Chambers.16 Sunstein argues that
technologies such as the internet are not aiding national political discourse but
splintering it. “If Republicans are talking only with Republicans, if Democrats
are talking primarily with Democrats, if members of the religious right speak
mostly to each other, and if radical feminists talk largely to radical feminists,
there is a potential for the development of different forms of extremism, and for
profound mutual misunderstandings with individuals outside the group.”17 A glut
of information and the ease of listening to only what you agree with, argues
Sunstein, will lead to national factions that generally ignore one another -- the
fractionalization of the Republic.18
China’s own internet revolution has touched off a similar debate. Many
argued that, in Thomas Friedman’s words, "the Internet and globalization, are
acting like nutcrackers to open societies. . . .” Bill Clinton argued that the Internet
will “democratize opportunity in the world in a way that has never been the case
in all of human history,” 19 while George W. Bush argued that, in China, the
Internet takes “freedom's genie . . . out of the bottle.” However, so far the
political change forecast in the 1990s has been far less than predicted. In
previous work, we have explored many of the ways the Chinese Party-state has
managed to maintain a grip on political power despite the dramatic changes in
communications. We have suggested that, in some ways, the Party-state has finehoned its use and control of information flows for political purposes. 20
Nonetheless, writers from Friedman through Nicolas Kristof continue to argue
that the Party-state’s grip will not survive the internet revolution. As Kristof wrote
in a 2005 column, Death by a Thousand Blogs, “the Chinese leadership . . . is
digging the Communist Party's grave, by giving the Chinese people broadband.”21
15

BENKLER, supra note 12, at 212. Writers like Benkler focus on internet-based, mass political
movements that make use of network technology. For example, Benkler tells the story of how a
variety of internet activists managed to make the security of Diebold voting machines a matter of
public concern in the 2000s, an issue in which the mass media was originally uninterested. Other
well-discussed examples are the internet-driven fundraising behind the Howard Dean campaign in
the 2004 election, the exposure of fraud behind various anti-Bush war records, and the purge of
Trent Lott from the Senate leadership. The general tenor is to suggest that, but for a more
democratic “citizen media,” history would have taken a much different course.
16
CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM (2001); CASS SUNSTEIN, ECHO CHAMBERS (2001); see also
Cass R. Sunstein, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1757, 1785–87 (1995).
17
SUNSTEIN, ECHO CHAMBERS, supra note 16, at 5.
18
See Federalist 10 (Madison), in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 77 (CLINTON ROSSITER ed., 1961).
19
William J. Clinton, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, The Gateway Computers
European Facility, Santry County Dublin, “Remarks by the President to Business Leaders, and
Officials
and
Employees
of
Gateway
Computers,”
Sept.
4,
1998,
http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/New/html/19980904-9108.html.
20
See WU & GOLDSMITH, supra note 9, at ch. 6; Benjamin L. Liebman, Watchdog or Demagogue?
The Media in the Chinese Legal System, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 82-91 (2005).
21
Nicholas Kristof, Death By a Thousand Blogs, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2005.
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In this article we come at these debates from a new angle by providing
detailed evidence of what is actually happening in China. What much of the
present debate misses is what happens when speech becomes far cheaper, yet still
not free -- where some forms of criticism are allowed, but not others.22 In our
example of China, direct criticism of Party rule is off limits, yet critiques of the
courts are more acceptable. The consequence, as we’ll see, is a directed form of
criticism whose social function is not well appreciated by our existing and
dominant means of understanding speech.
This study is also an opportunity to examine the impact of focused
criticism not on government in general, but on the courts specifically. Previous
writing in this area, focused on the media, has not devoted much attention to the
intricate relationship between mass, inexpert participation, and the functioning of
a legal system. The American free speech caselaw does concede the need for
restrictions on speech within the courts, and in exceptional cases for restrictions
on media coverage of court proceedings, but the effects of cheaper speech on the
judiciary itself are not as well understood. There is a simple explanation for this.
In the United States, the most obvious consequences of the internet revolution
have been for the media and business. Conversely, the operation of the judiciary
has been far less affected. This may reflect the American judiciary’s particular
tradition of independence and relative isolation from the direct influence of public
opinion.
Aside from better legal blogging, an occasional URL citation in
Supreme Court opinions, and greater competition for Westlaw and Lexis, it may
be that few of the decision-making methods of courts have changed.
But it is unsurprisingly that different countries are being differently
affected by a major change in the costs of communications. The effects of the
internet on the Chinese legal system are arguably far more profound than in
Europe or the United States.
Yet since these developments are largely not
discussed in the West, we find ourselves writing on new ground, with regard to
both China and the broader question of how new technologies may be affecting
judicial decision-making.
***
Judges are decision-makers, and to pursue the question of how
information affects judging, the tools of information economics will prove useful.
For that reason, we turn now to a review of some of the relevant literature on
information-transmission and decision-making.
B. The Economics of Information and Decision-Making

22

For more general commentary on the impact of the internet, see Anupam Chandler, Whose
Republic?, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1479 (2002), Thomas S. Ulen, Democracy and the Internet, 2 J L
TECH & POL 224 (2002); Mark S. Nadel, Customized News Services and Extremist Enclaves in
Republic.com, 54 STAN L REV 831, 857 (2001).
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Fredrick Hayek’s 1945 work The Use of Knowledge in Society is a starting
point for much of what has followed on the relevance of information to decisionmaking.23 Hayek argued that the advantages of the free market over a planned
economy were largely related to how a free market makes use of information.
The free market, he pointed out, is not obviously more efficient than a centralized,
planned production, since competition tends to be disorganized, duplicative, and
wasteful. Instead, said Hayek, the problem with models of centralized planning is
informational: no single actor can possess sufficient information to make all the
decisions necessary in a complex economy.
Conversely, the market’s
decentralized decisions about production, while certainly prone to error and waste,
are at least made on the basis of much more of the relevant information -- leading
to, in the aggregate, better decision-making. Market prices, in Hayek’s view,
were valuable public information about resource scarcity that a centralized
planner had difficulty replicating.
The study of decision-making given imperfect information has developed
into an entire field since Hayek’s time, often called “information economics.” 24
The tools of information economics are valuable for understanding the importance
of communications within a legal system.
First, in the information economics literature, a major distinction is made
between decision structures that are more horizontal or “polyarchical” in nature,
and those that are more vertical, or “hierarchical.”25 That difference in decision
structures is, for example, an essential difference between a planned and market
economy. Economists Raaj Kumar Sah and Joseph Stiglitz originally focused on
the differences between hierarchies and polyarchies for purposes of errorcorrection. But other writers, including economist Jeremy Stein, write about the
differences in information transmission in vertically -- and horizontally -organized institutions.26
23

35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945).
Since Hayek’s time the relationship between information-transmission and decision-making has
received much attention, and only the briefest of summaries will be attempted. Michael Spence,
Joseph Stiglitz and others have developed the field of information economics, which emphasizes
economic decision-making under conditions of imperfect information. See generally, Joseph
Stiglitz, Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics, Nobel Prize Lecture,
December 8, 2001. That has led to work on information asymmetries as a form of market failure
(and signaling as a remedy), the relative performance of decentralized and centralized decision
makers, the phenomenon of “herding behavior,” and other interactions between information and
the market. See, e.g., Raaj Kumar Sah & Joseph Stiglitz, The Architecture of Economic Systems:
Hierarchies and Polyarchies, 76 AMER. ECON. REV. 716 (1984); Raaj Sah & Joseph Stiglitz, The
Quality of Managers in Centralized Versus Decentralized Organizations, Q. J. ECON. 289 (1991);
PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION & MANAGEMENT 113-125 (1992);
David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, Herd Behavior and Investment, 80 AMER. ECON. REV.
465 (1990); Patrick Bolton & Mathias Dewatripont, The Firm as a Communication Network, 109
Q. J. ECON. 809 (1994). Versions of these ideas have reached the public in widely-read works
such as James Surowiecki’s The Wisdom of Crowds (2004).
25
See Sah & Stiglitz, The Architecture of Economic Systems, supra note 24; Sah & Stiglitz, The
Quality of Managers in Centralized Versus Decentralized Organizations, supra note 24.
26
See Jeremy C. Stein, Information Production and Capital Allocation: Decentralized Versus
24
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One type of decentralized decision-making system of great interest is
common-law courts. First, Hayek himself in 1960 argued that the English legal
system was a superior institution to the French, based on its decentralized
decision-making.27 Later, Richard Posner described the common law litigation
process as a source of rules -- and viewed judges as decentralized decision-makers
acting on the basis of local information, whose collective decision-making might,
over time, reach efficient results.28 The challenges to Posner’s thesis are wellknown.29 Nonetheless, the theory of common-law “learning” and the potential of
moving toward better rules has been influential.30
A second and particularly useful tool from information economics is the
theory of the “rational herd” or “information cascade.” The herding literature is
interested in the puzzles of mass behavior, like fashion trends, and mass mistakes,
such as stock market bubbles or the tendency of mutual fund managers to underperform the market. These theories model what happens when decision-makers
weigh not only their own judgment, but the collective volume of the decisions of
others. 31
The phenomenon of rational herding identifies situations where
decisions are decreasingly driven by one’s own information, and increasingly
driven by the actions of others.
The notion of rational herding has obvious implications for a legal system.
The prospect is that judges may similarly, and rationally, herd around a bad or
Hierarchical Firms, 57 J. FIN. 1891, 1891–93 (2002) (arguing that information that might be
easier to transmit, or “hard” information, like numbers, can be handled well by a hierarchy, while
“soft” information, such as a subjective assessment of managerial ability, might be better
processed by decentralized actors).
27
FREDRICH HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 194-196 (1960).
28
See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 320-28 (1st ed. 1973); Paul Rubin, Why is
the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977); George Priest, The Common Law
Process and the Selection of Efficient Legal Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977).
29
One obvious point is that judges who choose the wrong rules do not, like firms, go out of
business, and few today seem to believe that all common-law rules are efficient. See, e.g., Priest,
supra note 28; Lewis Kornhauser, Some Notes on the Logic of Legal Change, in THE LOGIC OF
SOCIAL CHANGE 169, 169 (D. BAYBROOKE ed., 1996); Gillian Hatfield, Bias in the Evolution of
Legal Rules, 80 GEO. L. J. 583 (1992).
30
Paul Mahoney, for example, has sought to demonstrate empirically that common law,
precedent-based systems create faster economic growth than civil systems, with data showing, on
average, slightly more than one-half a percent faster growth in the world’s common-law countries,
during the period 1962-1990. See Paul Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth:
Hayek Might Be Right, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 503-525 (2001). Mahoney “[controlled] for
starting per capita GDP, secondary school enrollment, population growth, investment, and other
factors.” Id.
31
For example, imagine that Restaurants A and B serve similar quality food, and that ten people,
who know nothing about the restaurants, arrive one by one. The first sequential decision-maker
D1 might decide, randomly, to go to restaurant B. The next, D2, if he weights D1’s decision
heavily, might make the same choice. Over time, restaurant B may be full, a powerful signal of
quality having nothing to do with the actual quality of the food.For a more in-depth overview, see
Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer & Ivo Welch, Learning from the Behavior of Others:
Conformity, Fads, and Informational Cascades, J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 12:3 151-170 (Summer
1998).
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suboptimal rule, yet due to the weight of cases behind the rule, be increasingly
hesitant to run against the crowd. Economists Andrew Daughety and Jennifer F.
Reinganum, in their paper on horizontal judicial herding, gave the example of
Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, where six circuit courts had agreed a law was
constitutional but were later reversed by the Supreme Court. 32 The example
showed that, perhaps due to herding effects, errors might remain long uncorrected
in a common-law system.
The prospect of judicial herding may seem like a serious challenge to the
utility of a common-law system. But as we discuss in Part III, doing what other
judges have done in similar cases may also be desirable -- for it’s a means for
judges to build their own political power. Herding may also be another word for
following a rule.33 As Eric Talley has written, healthy legal systems aim for a
balance between blind obedience and learning.34 They employ devices, like life
tenure, or the technique of distinguishing cases, that allow judges to break from
sub-optimal rules when they deem it necessary. An ideal system ought
simultaneously to provide predictability and the capacity to adapt, despite the
apparent contradiction.
These tools from the information economics literature help us understand
what’s at stake when we study communications within a judicial system. We now
to turn our empirical study of recent developments in the communications
practices in the Chinese judiciary.
II. CHINESE JUDGES AND THE INTERNET
Before beginning our analysis of the impact of the internet on the courts,
we offer a brief primer in the functioning of China’s courts and the Chinese
media.35 China has a lot of judges—most estimates say about 200,000, or roughly
twice the number of lawyers. Until recently, relatively few Chinese judges had
significant legal training: reports in mid-2005 stated that, for the first time, more
than fifty percent of judges were university graduates. A decade earlier the figure
was just twelve percent. In the past, many judges were retired military officials or
government cadres. As of 2002, however, new judges are required to be
university graduates and to pass the difficult national bar exam (which has a pass
rate of about ten percent). The Supreme People’s Court (SPC) has also devoted
enormous resources to training existing judges. Many of those who lack formal
training in law have been required to attend night-school or special training

32

Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Stampede to Judgment: Persuasive Influence
and Herding Behavior by Courts, 1 AM L & ECON REV 158 (1999).
33
See Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-In Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U.L. REV. 813 (1998).
34
See Eric Talley, Precedential Cascades: An Appraisal, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 87 (1999).
35
This discussion is based on Liebman, Watchdog, supra note 20; Benjamin L Liebman, China’s
Courts: Restricted Reform, CHINA Q. (forthcoming 2007); and Benjamin L. Liebman, Innovation
through Intimidation: An Empirical Account of Defamation Litigation in China, 47 HARV. INT’L
L. J. 33 (2006).
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programs. Older judges who lack legal training are being pushed into early
retirement, or are sometimes no longer permitted to hear cases.
For much of the reform period (1978-present), China’s courts have
remained relatively minor actors in the Chinese political system. Courts lack
significant power over other state institutions and have no formal powers of
judicial review. Under the Chinese Constitution, only the National People’s
Congress and its Standing Committee have the power to interpret laws or the
Constitution, though in practice the SPC plays an important role in interpreting
the law.
China’s legal system is national and unitary, with four levels of courts.
Most first instance cases are brought in basic level courts in counties or in districts
within cities. Appeals from such cases go to intermediate courts in municipalities,
or shi. Intermediate courts also hear certain categories of first instance cases -generally those involving large sums of money, or serious crimes, but also
sometimes cases that are politically sensitive. Provincial high courts (and the
high courts of municipalities with provincial rank, such as Beijing and Shanghai)
oversee the courts in their provinces, hear appeals from intermediate courts, and
have the power to rehear cases brought in all lower courts in their jurisdiction.
The SPC, with more than 200 judges, manages the court bureaucracy, hears
appeals and rehearings, and issues a large volume of interpretive documents
intended to guide lower courts in the application of the law. These range from
formal interpretations of laws, which often read like statutes themselves, to
responses to courts regarding the handling of individual cases pending in lower
courts.
Court caseloads have grown significantly since the beginning of legal
reforms in the late 1970s -- with some stating that China is now experiencing a
“litigation explosion.” Over the last five years the total number of cases heard in
China, has held steady at about eight million a year. Courts continue to be one of
many state institutions with responsibility for resolving disputes and hearing
grievances.
Problems in the Chinese courts have received widespread attention in both
the Chinese and international media. Corruption is said to be common, courts
often lack the power to enforce their decisions, and external intervention in
pending cases is widespread. Intervention comes from a range of sources. Local
government officials frequently pressure the courts in cases involving key local
interests. Courts find it hard to resist such pressure, in particular because judges
depend on local governments for their jobs and salaries. Court appointments (and
removals from office) are generally made by the local Communist Party branch
and government, and court budgets are dependent on local governments.
Communist Party Political-Legal Committees, which include senior police, court,
procuratorate, justice bureau, and Party officials, exist at each level of the Partystate, and discuss (and sometimes issue written suggestions in) major cases.
People’s congresses -- China’s legislatures -- have the formal power to
“supervise” the courts, and may from time to time issue requests or views to
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courts regarding cases. Individual Party officials also may intervene in cases of
particular concern, issuing written instructions to the courts regarding pending
cases, or sometimes simply discussing cases with court presidents.
In contrast to the courts, the Chinese media have long occupied a
privileged position in the Chinese political system. The media serve as both the
mouthpiece and the “eyes and ears” of the Party -- not only writing public reports
that appear in print or in broadcasts, but also “internal reports.” Internal reports
contain information for officials of a particular rank, reports that are deemed not
suitable for public dissemination. This means that when media views conflict
with those in the courts, Party officials tend to side with the media.
Commercialization of the Chinese media in the 1990s resulted in major
changes. Thousands of new publications appeared, mostly offshoots of traditional
Communist Party mouthpiece newspapers.
These commercialized papers
compete fiercely with one another, often by providing sensational or hard-hitting
reports. They also generate profits for their parent publications, which continue in
their “official” or “mouthpiece” propaganda roles. The growth of the internet
brought further competition, with papers and web portals now competing to
attract readers on-line as well as in-print, often by providing content that skirts the
edges of what is permissible.
China’s media regulatory system, although challenged by the growth of
commercialized media and the internet, remains fundamentally unchanged.
Regulations restrict who can enter the market -- ensuring that the overwhelming
majority of publications and broadcasters in China are state-controlled (albeit
often in corporatized form).
The Party’s Central Propaganda Department
(“CPD”) oversees all media content, relying on both circulars that prohibit certain
content, and also on a system of post-publication sanctions that target those who
go beyond permissible boundaries. Local propaganda departments at the
provincial, municipal, and local level likewise oversee content in local media,
often supplementing CPD restrictions with their own local restrictions on content.
The job of the CPD and local and provincial propaganda departments has
become much more difficult in recent years. The commercialization of the media
means that there is vastly more content available than at any prior point in
Chinese history. And the growth of the internet, as we will show, means that
news spreads much more quickly than before -- often before propaganda
departments can react to impose bans. Chinese authorities have not been passive
in response to such challenges. As has been widely reported in the western media,
China devotes substantial resources to monitoring and controlling the internet.
This includes ordering websites to prohibit discussion of certain topics, or to
remove controversial articles. Sites that go too far are shut. One result is that
self-censorship by commercial internet news providers is perhaps the most
effective means by which authorities maintain control over reporting and
discussion of controversial topics online.
The following sections set forth our empirical findings. They are based on
extensive review of Chinese writings and on interviews with more than 100
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scholars, reporters, lawyers, and judges about the impact of the internet on
China’s courts. Interviews with judges were conducted in three provinces in
China and in two cities with provincial rank. Judges ranged from those sitting on
provincial high courts, to well-educated judges in major cities, to judges in small
county towns who lacked formal training in law. 36 We freely admit the
limitations of our methodology: those likely to interact with us are most likely
younger, more liberal, and more likely to use the internet, than many others in
China. Nevertheless, their descriptions of the impact of the internet provide a
crucial base for understanding the important changes we believe are taking place
in China’s courts.
A. External Pressures
China’s own internet revolution has made it much easier for the public, the
media, and the Party-state to become aware of and criticize the Chinese legal
system and its courts. Although that may sound good, the results, from a rule-oflaw perspective, have both attractive and less attractive aspects.
Sometimes cheaper information has meant better accountability and
pressure for important reform. As we discuss below, courts or legal institutions
that are neglecting or deliberately abusing their duties can be exposed and
subjected to public or media pressure. Bad decisions, corrupt judges, and unjust
procedures are sometimes brought to light by internet communications, leading to
important reforms.
Yet the same mechanism can create excessive pressure on the courts. As
we discuss, unpopular decisions can attract a strong public reaction — the
“internet manhunt” — and subsequent political intervention to quell public
outrage. The internet plays a crucial role in making both Party leadership and the
courts aware of public opinion, which is important in a system in which other
outlets for public opinion are restricted. But the effect may be more mixed in a
system where only one segment of public opinion is being heard, where the media
play an active role in generating popular outrage online, and when such opinion is
significantly restricted due to Communist Party control and oversight of the media.
1. Greater Accountability. -- In 2003, Sun Zhigang, a university graduate
working as a graphic designer in the southern city of Guangzhou, was detained by
police for failing to have the temporary residence permits required of migrant
workers. Three days after his arrest Sun was beaten to death while in a local
detention center for migrants.37
More than a month after Sun’s killing, on April 25, 2003, the leading
commercial newspaper in Guangdong Province, Southern Metropolitan Daily,
carried a report on the case, entitled “Only Missing a Temporary Residence
36

All interviews were conducted by Liebman. All interviewees were promised complete
anonymity, and thus we identify neither their name nor the location in which the interviews took
place.
37
For details of the case see Liebman, Watchdog or Demagogue?, supra note 20, at 82-91 (2005).
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Permit, College Graduate is Beaten to Death.” Local Communist Party
Propaganda Department officials immediately banned any further discussion of
the case in the local media. But the ban was ineffective. The Southern
Metropolitan Daily article had already been posted to the paper’s web site on the
day of publication, and had been subsequently reposted to numerous other internet
web sites.
It even showed up on the web site of the People’s Daily, the
mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party.
Within hours, internet discussion forums filled with discussion of the
case. 38 Noting the article in the Party’s People’s Daily, numerous other
newspapers subsequently reported on the case, carrying follow-up stories that
were also posted and reposted online. On May 13, three weeks after the original
report and following weeks of online discussion of the case, authorities
announced that they had detained thirteen suspects. A month later, twelve
defendants were convicted for their roles in the case, and the two “primary
culprits” were sentenced to death and life in prison, respectively.39
The impact of the case -- and of the internet -- did not end with the trial.
Following the arrests in May, a group of academics and journalists launched an
assault on the detention system under which Sun had been apprehended, known as
Custody and Repatriation. In an effort coordinated with print and online media,
two groups of lawyers and scholars issued petitions calling on the system to be
abolished because it was unconstitutional. The petitions themselves were not
printed in full in the official media, but were widely available online.40 Media
38

Nanfang Zhoumo: Renmin Wang Wenzhang Zengjia Le Zhenpo Sun Zhigang An De Juexin
[Southern Weekend: Articles on People’s Daily Online Strengthens the Determination to Crack
the Sun Zhigang Case], NANFANG ZHOUMO [SOUTHERN WEEKEND], June 6, 2003, available at
http://past.people.com.cn/GB/news/8410/20030606/1010138.html (discussing the internet’s role in
the case) [LZ-36]; Zhongguo Zhi Sheng: Sun Zhigang Shijian [The Voice of China: The Sun
Zhigang
Affair],
Human
Rights
Watch,
http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/china/beijing08/voices_ch.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2006) (stating
that tens of thousands of postings protesting the case appeared, on all popular websites in China,
and including examples of such postings) [LZ-37]; see also Teng Biao, Sun Zhigang Shijian:
Zhishi, Meijie Yu Quanli [The Sun Zhigang Affair: Intelligence, Media and Power], FALÜ SIXIANG
WANG [LAW THINKER WEB], Oct. 25, 2004, http://law-thinker.com/show.asp?id=2703 [LZ-39]
(describing online discussions of the case and the important role of the internet).
39
In addition, twenty-three officials were given administrative sanctions for their mishandling of
the case.
40
For discussion of the petitions, see Guo Liang, Zhongguo Hulianwang De Fazhan: Dongli Yiji
Dui Minyi De Yingxiang [The Development of Internet in China: Dynamics and Influence on
Public Opinion], Zhongguo Hulianwang Yanjiu Xiangmu [China Internet Research Project], Apr.
26, 2004, http://www.wipchina.org/?p1=content&p2=05013000345 [LZ-34]; Teng Biao, [LZ-39],
supra note 38; Cui Li, Wu Zhuanjia Jiu Sun Zhigang An Tiqing Renda Qidong Tebie Diaocha
Chengxu [Five Experts Petitions to the NPC to Initiate Special Investigation Proceedings],
ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN BAO [CHINA YOUTH DAILY], May 28, 2003, available at
http://www.npcnews.com.cn/gb/paper7/30/class000700001/hwz236693.htm
[LZ-41];
San
Gongmin Shangshu Renda Jianyi Dui Shourong Banfa Jinxing Weixian Shencha [Three Citizens
Petition to the NPC Calling for Constitutional Review of the Custody and Repatriation Provisions],
ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN BAO [CHINA YOUTH DAILY], May 16, 2003, available at
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/20030516/993964.html [LZ-40].
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coverage highlighted their demands, leading to online discussion and reposting of
the petition.41 Reports also noted some of the widespread abuses in the system,
including numerous reports of other inmates also being murdered while in
detention. Websites provided significantly wider-ranging discussions of the case
than those appearing in the traditional media.42
Shortly after the June trial of the defendants in the Sun case, China’s State
Council announced that the Custody and Repatriation System was being scrapped
and replaced with a system designed to shift the emphasis from punishing
migrants to assisting them by establishing “a caring assistance system” of “aid
stations” that provide migrants with shelter and food. 43 Although official
comments stated that the changes simply reflected changed conditions in China
and some involved in the drafting of the new regulations noted that the changes
had been contemplated since before the incident, the link to the Sun Zhigang case
and ensuing public outcry was clear.
The Sun Zhigang case is an example of how the growth of investigative
journalism in China, in particular among the market-driven newspapers that
developed throughout the 1990s, combined with the internet, is resulting in much
greater attention to law and the legal system than at any prior point in Chinese
history.44 Prior to commercialization of the media, press reports on the courts
tended to be declaratory statements of the outcomes of cases, often written by
court officials. Increased competition among the print media brought greater
scrutiny to the courts and to legal issues more generally, along with greater
critical coverage of decisions perceived as unjust. Yet prior to the growth of the
internet, discussions of cases in one region, even in the commercialized media,
often went unnoticed elsewhere, and it was relatively easy for Propaganda
Department officials to terminate discussion of cases by banning further media
reports. A daring newspaper, such as Southern Weekend, might expose gross
injustice, but officials could move swiftly to terminate follow-up reports.
Otherwise, courts often operated in relative obscurity. Decisions might be
reported in a local newspaper, or not at all.
41

For discussion of the internet’s role in the case, see Ouyang Bin, Hulianwang Chongji
Zhongguo Shehui Shengtai [Internet’s Impact on the Environment of Chinese Society], Fenghuang
Wang
[Phoenix
TV
Net],
available
at
http://www.phoenixtv.com.cn/home/phoenixweekly/141/30page.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2006)
[LZ-31]; Guo Liang [LZ-34], supra note 40.
42
For example, a well-known Peking University professor engaged in a pointed two-hour online
discussion on the case; the transcript is available at He Weifang, Cong Sun Zhigang Shijian Kan
Zhongguo Fazhi Fazhan [Development of Rule of Law in China as Reflected by the Sun Zhigang
Affair],
RENMIN
WANG
[PEOPLE’S
DAILY
ONLINE],
June
10,
2003,
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shehui/46/20030610/1013342.html[LZ-42].
43
670,000 Urban Vagrants Get Assistance in China, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, Dec. 23, 2004,
available at http://english.people.com.cn/200412/23/eng20041223_168443.html; Vagrants Get
Aid as New System Begins in China, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, Aug. 1, 2003, available at
http://english.people.com.cn/200308/01/eng20030801_121435.shtml.
44
For discussion of the development of the commercialized media in China and the rise of
investigative journalism, see Liebman, Watchdog or Demagogue, supra note 20, at 23-41
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That’s changing. As the Sun case shows, thanks mainly to the internet
and the birth of competing internet news sites, cases that might once have been
invisible, or have disappeared, can receive national attention, sometimes virtually
instantly. In other cases, web sites and web discussion forums spread news of
cases where local Propaganda Department officials have instructed the official
media not to report on such cases. In addition to the famous Sun Zhigang case,
numerous other cases of alleged injustice have attracted widespread coverage and
discussion on the internet. We now discuss two additional examples, the
wrongful convictions of She Xianglin and Nie Shubin.
In 1994 a woman named Zhang Zaiyu disappeared. Zhang’s family
accused her husband, She Xianglin, of killing her. When police found the body of
an unidentified woman in a nearby water tower, which relatives identified as
Zhang, they charged She with murder. After She confessed to the murder,
allegedly under torture, he was sentenced to death. On appeal the Hubei Province
High People’s Court sent the case back for retrial due to insufficient evidence, and
She was sentenced to 15 years in prison for intentional homicide.45
Eleven years later, on March 28, 2005, Zhang Zaiyu reappeared alive and
married to a different man.46 An initial report on Zhang’s reappearance ran in a
local paper in Wuhan, the capital of Hubei Province. Following the report, local
authorities banned further reporting on the case pending an official investigation,
and instructed the media to use only an officially approved report on the case.47
But news quickly spread online and to other newspapers. A few weeks later, on
April 15, She was released from custody. Media coverage may not have been
solely responsible for She being freed -- authorities reopened the case
immediately after Zhang returned home. But such coverage did appear to assist
She in obtaining 460,000 yuan (approximately 57,000 U.S. dollars) in
compensation for his wrongful incarceration. The settlement was reported to be
the largest from the state in Chinese history.48
As in the Sun Zhigang case, the media linked the case to broader problems
in the Chinese criminal justice system. One report on the She case argued such
wrongful conviction cases reflected the pressure placed on local authorities to
solve cases and assuage popular anger. 49 Official explanations, in contrast,
blamed the case on historical circumstances and the weakness of the legal system
45

Cong Nie Shubin Dao She Xianglin: Cuoan Zhaoxue Buneng Jiwang Yu Ouran [From Nie
Shubin to She Xianglin: Correcting Wrongful Convictions Cannot Rely Only on Chance], Apr. 3,
2005, http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2005-04/03/content_2779236.htm[LP-35].
46
Id. [LP-35].
47
See Lü Zongshu, Jizhe Diaocha: She Xianglin “Sha Qi” Cuo An [Journalist’s Investigation:
The Wrongful Conviction of She Xianglin for “Killing his Wife”], RENMIN WANG [PEOPLE’S
DAILY ONLINE], July 27, 2005, http://media.people.com.cn/GB/22114/47850/47855/3572767.html
[LZ-44].
48
Hu Bing & Yan Hua, She Xianglin Nadao 46 Wan Peichang He Buchang Kuan [She Xianglin
Obtains 460,000 Yuan in Compensation], ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG [CHINA COURT WEB], Sept.
3, 2005, http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=176316 [LP-38].
49
From Nie Shubin to She Xianglin [LP-35], supra note 45.
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at the time of She’s conviction, and praised the efforts of local authorities to
resolve the matter.50
Another illustrative example is the wrongful conviction case of Nie
Shubin. In 1994, a court in Hebei Province found Nie Shubin guilty of rape and
murder. Nie was executed the following year. Eleven years later, in 2005, a
second man named Wang Shujin confessed to the original rape and murder.
The confession story was originally reported on in March by a reporter
from the Henan Commercial News, reprinted in the Beijing News and followed-up
on by a report in Southern Weekend. 51 All of the reports subsequently were
posted to and circulated online. Local authorities refused to reopen Nie’s case,
and the media began to complain of a cover-up. A report in Southern Weekend,
for example, asked why the local authorities failed to release details of their
investigation into the case, and inquired whether the case would “disappear.”52
The report also noted that all details about the case had been removed from the
police website.53 Likewise, a report in the Beijing News, issued on March 15,
questioned why the police, procuratorate, and court involved in the case had
refused to take any action or to comment on the case.54 Following the report,
propaganda department officials apparently ordered the media not to carry further
reports on the case.55 However, reports continued to circulate, both in print and
online, suggesting that the ban was either very limited or was widely ignored.56
50

Jingmen Shouci Gongkai Zongjie She Xianglin An Jiaoxun: Youzui Tuiding Shi Shouyin
[Jingmen for the First Time Summarizes Publicly the Lessons from the She Xianglin Case: The
Crucial Reason is the Presumption of Guilt], XINHUA WANG [XINHUA WEB], July 19, 2005,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2005-07/19/content_3239399.htm [LP-36].
51
“Nie Shubin Yuansha An” Xuan Er Wei Jue, Fang “Goudui” Gongzhong Yu Yidi Diaocha
[“The Case of Nie Shubin’s Wrongful Execution” is Pending, and the Public Calls Out for an
External Investigation in Order to Avoid “Compromising”], NANFANG ZHOUMO [SOUTHERN
WEEKEND], Mar. 24, 2005, http://www.southcn.com/weekend/commend/200503240006.htm [LZ57].
52
Zhao Ling, Nie Shubin An Juedui Buhui Bu Liao Liao Zhi [Nie Shubin Case Will Absolutely Not
End Up With No Outcome], NANFANG ZHOUMO [SOUTHERN WEEKEND], Apr. 28, 2005, available
at http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/ZM/20050428/xw/fz/200504280005.asp [LP-41].
53
Previously, the Guangpin county public security web site had included details of the case in a
prominent place. Id. [LP-41].
54
Wugu Qingnian 10 Nian Qian Zao Cuo Sha? [An Innocent Youth Was Executed Wrongfully 10
Years Ago?], XIN JING BAO [THE BEIJING NEWS], Mar. 15, 2005, available at
http://news.hexun.com/detail.aspx?lm=1697&id=1068197[LZ-49]; see also Zhao Ling,
[LP-41], supra note 52; “Nie Shubin An” Geng Xuyao Gongzhong Haobu Songxie De Jinmi
Guanzhu [“Nie Shubin Case” Needs More of the Public’s Continuing and Intense Attention],
NANFANG DUSHI BAO [SOUTHERN METROPOLITAN NEWS], Apr. 22, 2005, available at
http://www.southcn.com/opinion/politics/200504220359.htm (discussing the case) [LP-42].
55
Zhongxuanbu Jinji Tongzhi Jinzhi Baodao Nie Shubin Bei Cuosha An [The Central Propaganda
Department Urgently Circulates Notice Banning Reports of the Case of Nie Shubin’s Wrongful
Execution],
BOXUN
XINWEN
WANG
[BOXUN
NEWSNET],
Mar.
21,
2005,
http://www.peacehall.com/news/gb/china/2005/03/200503211409.shtml [LZ-51]; Fu Yingji, 2005
Nian Zhongguo Wangluo Shier Da Bei Shan Xinwen [Twelve Big Pieces of News Deleted from the
Chinese Internet in 2005], available at http://forum.chinesenewsnet.com/archive/index.php/t19858.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2006) and
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On the same day the Beijing News report appeared, the Hebei Province
High People’s Court launched an investigation into the case. The Court did so
after written instruction from leaders of the Political-Legal Committee of the
Provincial Communist Party. 57 Although rumors later circulated online that an
internal investigation had determined that the case had not been incorrectly
decided,58 as of mid-2006 no official decision had been announced.59
Nie Shubin’s family may still be waiting for justice. But, as with the Sun
Zhigang case, the most important effect of the Nie and She cases was not the
outcome of the individual cases, but their effect on national policy. At the end of
2005, China’s Supreme People’s Court (SPC) announced that it was revising
China’s procedures for handling capital cases. Under the new rules, final review
of all capital cases will be conducted by the SPC. In the past, such review power
was delegated to provincial high courts -- which were also responsible for hearing
appeals of capital cases. The new procedures create a third tier of review. In
addition, the SPC rules require appeals in capital cases to be heard in open court.60
Although pressure, both domestic and international, had been building for such
changes for some time, the wave of public attention to the Nie, She, and other

http://www.wangbingzhang.us/forum/wbz/messages/4381.html [LZ-59]. The two sources that
reported on the ban are overseas media, and may have overstated the reach of the ban. Although
both reports stated that the CPD had imposed a ban, it appears more likely that any ban was
imposed by local, not national, propaganda department officials. For a collection of commentary
on the case, see Xiao Han, Guanzhu Nie Shubin Mengyuan Sixing An [Pay Attention to Nie
Shubin’s Wrongly Adjudicated Death Penalty Case], ZHONG PIN WANG [CHINA REVIEW WEB],
Mar. 22, 2004, http://www.china-review.com/tbzt/050322bianzhean.htm [LZ-60].
56
The Case of Nie Shubin Killed Wrongfully is Pending, [LZ-57], supra note 51; Zhao Ling, [LP41] supra note 52; Qian Haoping, Hebei Chongxin Diaocha Nie Shubin An, Cheng Zuiduan
Shijian Nei Huan Shishi Zhenxiang [Hebei Re-investigates the Nie Shubin Case, Stating They will
Reveal the Truth in the Shortest Time Possible], HEXUN YAOWEN [HEXUN CRITICAL NEWS], Mar.
18, 2005, http://news.hexun.com/detail.aspx?lm=1716&id=1073687 [LZ-50].
57
Qian Haoping [LZ-50], supra note 56.
58
Hebei Zuochu Nie Shubin An “Bushi Cuoan” De Rending [Hebei Makes Determination that the
Nie Shubin Case “Was Not Wrongfully Decided”], BOXUN XINWEN WANG [BOXUN NEWSNET],
Apr. 22, 2005,
http://www.peacehall.com/news/gb/china/2005/04/200504220259.shtml [LZ-52].
59
Nanfang Dushi Bao: Feiyao Zhaoqi Nie An De Yuanshi Xingzhen Jilu Ma [Southern
Metropolitan Daily: Are All the Original Administrative Records of Nie Case Required],
NANFANG DUSHI BAO [SOUTHERN METROPOLITAN DAILY], Jan. 7, 2006, available at
http://news.163.com/06/0107/01/26R26J510001124T.html [LZ-53]. One report stated that the
family of Nie Shubin had heard that officials had determined that there was no error, but had not
received any formal notification to this effect. “‘Nie Shubin Qiangjian Sharen An’ Bushi Cuoan”
[“‘The Nie Shubin Rape and Murder Case’ Was Not Wrongfully Decided”], GUANGZHOU RIBAO
[GUANGZHOU DAILY], Apr. 20, 2005, available at http://gzdaily.dayoo.com/gb/content/200504/20/content_2023768.htm [LZ-61].
60
Yearender: Media’s Frequent Exposure of Unjust Cases Promotes Judicial Reform, PEOPLE’S
DAILY
ONLINE,
Dec.
19,
2005,
available
at
http://english.people.com.cn/200512/19/eng20051219_229034.html.
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wrongful conviction cases during 2005 appeared to be a crucial factor leading the
SPC to make the changes.61
Most such cases follow a pattern similar to those of the Sun, She and Nie
cases. Traditional print media initially report on the case, the report is posted to
the media’s official web page, and then is reposted to numerous other websites.
The articles result in widespread discussion online, in particular in web discussion
forums.62 Such discussion and coverage encourages follow-up reports in the print
media, reports that are subsequently reposted to the internet.
The interaction between print and online media is important. Chinese
regulations on the internet restrict the ability of internet providers to create their
own news content.
With just a few exceptions, only traditional media are
permitted to generate news stories.63 The number of web sites legally qualified to
print original news is unclear; a 2004 report stated that 163 web sites were legally
qualified to publish news, while another 1400 were permitted to offer “news
service” -- which generally means they are permitted to reprint articles that have
already appeared in the official media.64 Websites with the ability to generate
original news content are generally those linked to national, provincial and local
Communist Party mouthpiece newspapers. 65 Another important difference
between the traditional media and online media is that the online media are more
likely to carry commentaries on cases while they are pending. The traditional
media usually wait to discuss cases until decisions have been made.66
An additional crucial feature of the Sun, She and Nie cases is that the
internet facilitates coverage by the media in jurisdictions other than those in
61

Fazhi Ribao: Dianji 2005 Nian Si Da Falü Guanjian Ci [Legal Daily: Clicking on Four Key
Legal Words in the Year 2005], Jan. 10, 2006, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2006-0110/08317940186s.shtml (discussing the effect of the Nie and She cases) [LZ-58].
62
In some cases in which initial reports in the official media are blocked, information on the cases
is first posted to web sites. Once sufficient public discussion has been generated, and official
attitudes toward the case have become clear, the official media will then report on the case.
Ouyang Bin [LZ-31], supra note 41.
63
Hulianwang Xinwen Xinxi Fuwu Guanli Guiding [Provisions for the Administration of Internet
News Information Services], Guowuyuan Xinwen Bangongshi, Xinxi Chanye Bu Di 37 Hao Ling
[The Information Office of the State Council and the Ministry of Information, Industry Order No.
37]
(Sept.
25,
2005),
available
at
http://law.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/SLC/SLC.asp?Db=chl&Gid=60145 [LZ-46] (stating
that only web sites linked to traditional media are permitted to generate their own news stories);
Hulian Wangzhan Congshi Dengzai Xinwen Yewu Guanli Zanxing Guiding [Temporary
Provisions for the Administration of Internet Websites’ Service of Posting News Information],
Guowuyuan Xinwen Bangongshi & Xinxi Chanye Bu [The Information Office of the State
Council & the Ministry of Information Industry], Nov. 7, 2000, available at
http://info.people.com.cn/EComClnt/index2.jsp [LZ-47].
64
Shi Jiangmin, “Wangluo Chuanbo” Zai Jing Zhengshi Chuangkan [“Internet Broadcast”
Officially Published in Beijing], RENMIN WANG [PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE], April 20, 2004,
available at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/14677/14737/22035/2458358.html [LZ48].
65
Id. (listing examples); Liebman, Watchdog or Demagogue?, supra note 20.
66
Interview 2006-26.
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which a case occurred. In the Nie case, what might have been a local issue was
reported by media from Beijing, Henan, and Guangdong. The significance lies in
the fact that in many cases local propaganda authorities will block local media
from reporting on local cases. 67
Another, recent example of such trans-provincial news coverage is the
defamation action brought against the authors of the best-selling -- but
subsequently banned -- book, An Investigation into China’s Peasants. The book
detailed problems facing China’s peasants, including abuse and over-taxation by
local authorities. A Party official in Anhui Province sued the publisher and
author in local court, arguing that the book had defamed him.68 After an initial
flurry of coverage in the print media, the Central Propaganda Department banned
further reporting on the case.69 Despite the ban, widespread discussion of the case
continued online -- putting the court under pressure not to act too obviously to
protect the local official. Continued internet postings also highlighted the court’s
ongoing failure to resolve the case.70
The Investigation into China’s Peasants case has yet to be resolved, and
the long delay suggests that the court either continues to struggle to determine
how to handle the case, or has decided to ignore it. 71 According to a widely
circulated email written by the defendants’ lawyer in April 2006, the court
handling the case has decided to leave the case unresolved and not issue any
decision. But it does appear that the continued attention to the case, in part via
online media, resulted in pressure on the court to follow procedural norms and not
to act immediately to protect local interests.
The Sun, She and Nie cases show how the combined efforts of traditional
and online media can force authorities to reopen cases and redress longstanding
injustices. Meanwhile, the Investigation into China’s Peasants case shows how
67

In mid-2005, China’s Central Propaganda Department issued new rules restricting “non-local
news.” The rules, which ban local media from writing original news content on other jurisdictions
in China, is apparently a direct response to the widespread practice of non-local media engaging in
investigative reporting. Nailene Chou Wiest, Closing of Loopholes to Further Gag Media, S.
CHINA
MORNING
POST
(Online),
June
11,
2005,
available
at
http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=25640 .
68
Ruo Qiao, “Zhongguo Nongmin Diaocha” Beigao Mingyu Qinquan Yuanshu Zuozhe Jujue
Tingwai Hejie [Authors of “Investigation into China’s Peasants” Are Sued for Defamation and
Refuse to Settle Out of Court], CHENGDU SHANG BAO [CHENGDU COMMERCIAL NEWS], Feb. 25,
2004, available at http://www.booktide.com/news/20040225/200402250013.html [LZ-62].
69
Lianghui Qian Beijing Yankong Yulun Fengsha “Zhongguo Nongmin Diaocha” [Beijing Tightly
Controls the Media before the Two Meetings, Bans “Investigation into China’s Peasants”]
BOXUN
XINWEN
WANG
[BOXUN
NEWSNET],
Feb.
29,
2004,
http://www.peacehall.com/news/gb/china/2004/02/200402291359.shtml [LZ-63].
70
Bentai Dujia Huode “Zhongguo Nongmin Diaocha” An Bianhu Lüshi Pu Zhiqiang Zhi
Shenpanzhang Yi Xin [Exclusive: Letter to the Chief Judge from Pu Zhiqiang, Lawyer for the
Defendants in the “Investigation into China’s Peasants” Case], Radio Free Asia, July 11, 2005,
available at http://www.rfa.org/mandarin/shenrubaodao/2005/07/11/puzhiqiang/ [LZ-64].
71
Chinese courts encountering difficult or sensitive cases frequently either refuse to allow such
cases to be filed, or simply never decide such cases. For a discussion of the phenomenon, see
Liebman, Restricted Reform, supra note 35.
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online media may help keep discussion alive when traditional media are barred
from such discussions, and how email can be used to spread news of cases where
reporting has been banned.
2. Internet Populism. -- In the Sun Zhigang case, public pressure led to
more attention to the treatment of migrants within China. Media pressure, fanned
by internet discussion, forced authorities to investigate the case, make arrests, and
abolish the detention system that led to his death. The case may have resulted in
belated justice for Sun. But it was less clear that those accused of being his killers
received fair trials. Public pressure resulted in rushed and closed trials of the
defendants, with court judgments that appeared preordained by Party leaders. The
trial in the case was held in June 2003, just six weeks after the case first came to
light. The Guangdong Province High People’s Court affirmed the lower court’s
decision in the case on June 27, and Qiao Yanqin, the principal defendant, was
executed the same day.72
Only three official media outlets were permitted to send reporters to the
trial. Propaganda officials instructed other media to use only reports from the
official Xinhua News Agency, and Internet portals were told to terminate
discussion of the case. Some journalists and other observers questioned the
fairness of the trial, arguing that the death sentence imposed on Qiao Yanqin was
excessive, and asked why charges had focused on a low-ranking nurse and other
inmates in the detention center, rather than on higher-ranking officials. But such
discussions were generally not permitted online or in print. Instead, official
accounts focused on praising authorities’ speedy handling of the case, and on the
court’s responsiveness to public opinion. 73 And in a final development, the
editors of the paper that originally broke the story of Sun Zhigang’s murder were
later imprisoned, albeit for “unrelated” corruption charges. 74
In 2003, Liu Yong likewise found that angry online discussion of a case
can lead to execution. Liu, an organized crime boss, was convicted in the early
2000s of a range of crimes, including organizing a criminal syndicate, bribery,
and illegal possession of firearms.75 An intermediate court in Liaoning Province
72

Sun Zhigang An Zhongshen Weichi Yuanpan, Zhufan Qiao Yanqin Bei Zhixing Sixing [Final
Decision of Sun Zhigang Case Affirms the First Trial Decision: Principal Criminal is Executed],
WANG
[PEOPLE’S
DAILY
ONLINE],
June
27,
2003,
RENMIN
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shehui/1061/1939883.html [LZ-43].
73
See, e.g., Gong An Bu: Sun Zhigang Anjian De Chuli Shi Xunsu, Jianjue He Yansu De [The
Ministry of Public Security: The Resolution of Sun Zhigang Case is Speedy, Determined and
Serious],
XINHUA
WANG
[XINHUA
NEWS],
Aug.
7,
2003,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/weekend/2003-08/07/content_1016300.htm [LZ-54].
74
Liebman, Watchdog or Demagogue, supra note 20. The same newspaper, Southern
Metropolitan News, had also been the first to report on the SARS epidemic in 2003. Observers
suggested that the editors were punished for their coverage of both the Sun case and the SARS
crisis.
75
Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Zaishen Liu Yong An Xingshi Panjue Shu (2003) Xing Ti Zi Di 5 Hao
[Supreme People’s Court Decision in the Retrial of the Liu Yong Criminal (2003) Criminal Retrial
No.
5],
Dec.
20,
2003,
available
at
http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=96393 [LZ-55].

11/10/06 Draft

CHINA’S NETWORK JUSTICE

22

tried his case and sentenced him to death. On appeal in 2003, however, the
Liaoning High People’s Court reduced his sentence to life in prison. One reason
for the reduction was the fact that Liu’s confession had been obtained through
torture.76
A Shanghai paper, Bund Pictorial, quickly questioned the reduction in
sentence. 77 News of the court’s decision spread rapidly online -- one major
internet portal ran a headline on its news home page, stating in large font “Liu
Yong Will Not Die.” The media suggested that Liu’s ties to officials in Liaoning
Province resulted in favorable treatment.78 Reporters criticized academics who
had written expert opinions -- in return for sizable fees — in support of Liu.79
Web discussion forums filled with angry commentary, denouncing Liu’s “lenient”
treatment.
Following the public outcry, the Supreme People’s Court decided to
rehear the case. The Court invoked a rarely-used procedure that permits the court
to try de novo questionably-decided cases.80 In a carefully scripted trial, Liu’s
case was heard on a Friday. The court announced its decision -- reinstating the
death penalty -- on the following Monday morning. Liu was executed the same
morning.

76

The court stated that it had reduced the sentence in light of the facts and circumstances of the
case, and noted that torture could not be ruled out. The Provincial High Court Opinion is not
publicly available, but the decision is summarized in the SPC’s opinion.
77
Waitan Huabao: Dui Shenyang Heibang Toumu Liu Yong Gaipan Sihuan De Zhiyi [Bund
Pictorial: Questions on the Gang Leader Liu Yong’s Reduced Sentence of Death with Reprieve],
WAITAN HUABAO [BUND PICTORIAL], Aug. 21, 2003, available at http://news.sina.com.cn/c/200308-21/01351583471.shtml [LZ-LY6].
78
Shenyang Heibang Laoda Liu Yong Heyi Ruci Xiaozhang, Gandie Ganma Houtai Ying [Why Is
the Shenyang Gang Leader Liu Yong So Aggressive: He has Godparents as Strong Backup],
SANLIAN SHENGHUO ZHOUKAN [SANLIAN LIFE WEEKLY], Mar. 8, 2001, available at
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/202847.html [LZ-LY7].
79
Falü Zhuanjia Lunzheng Ganrao Sifa Gongzheng, Jixing Zhidu Chansheng Guaitai [Legal
Experts’ Analyze Interference in Judicial Justice, Monster Baby is Born By the Malformed System],
NANFANG DUSHI BAO [SOUTHERN METROPOLITAN DAILY], Oct. 9, 2003, available at
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2003-10-09/11591884089.shtml [LZ-LY3]. In an online discussion
forum on the case one posting claimed that each expert earned 300,000 yuan for writing in support
of Liu Yong. The experts denied this. One of them told journalists that they received only 2000
yuan each. Id. [LZ-LY3]
80
Pursuant to the tishen, or “elevation and trial” procedures, the SPC can rehear cases decided by
lower courts even absent a request from the parties that they do so. One report stated that the case
was the “first ordinary criminal case” in which the SPC had used the procedures; one prior known
tishen case was the trial of the Gang of Four. Gaofa Tishen Liu Yong You Liang Da Yuanyin,
Zhuanjia Cheng Ci Tixian Fazhi Jinbu [Two Reasons for the SPC to Retry the Liu Yong Case,
Experts Claim It Reflects Major Progress in the Legal System], BEIJING WANBAO [BEIJING
EVENING
NEWS],
Dec.
17,
2003,
available
at
http://news.sohu.com/2003/12/17/81/news217048181.shtml [LZ-LY1]; Zuigao Yuan Jinri Tishen
“Liu Yong An”, Liang Da Xuannian Youdai Jiekai [SPC Retries the Liu Yong Case Today, Two
Big Questions are Waiting to be Resolved], BEIJING CHENBAO [BEIJING MORNING POST], Dec. 18,
2003, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2003-12/18/content_1236925.htm [LY-10].
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Media outlets and some academics described the decision as an
appropriate response to popular opinion.81 Various web sites carried morbidly
detailed accounts of each step of the case -- including, on the date of Liu’s
judgment and execution, hourly reports that described the court judgment,
transportation of Liu to the execution ground and his body to the crematorium,
and then return of his ashes to his family. 82 The sina.com page on the case
included links to more than 100 articles and commentaries.83 Some declared the
case a victory for “public opinion.”84
The official media hailed the Liu Yong and Sun Zhigang cases as
examples of successful official responses to public demands demonstrating
China’s progress toward a more just and democratic society. Yet subsequent
cases also demonstrate that the Party propaganda officials have become
increasingly conscious of the need to manage online discussion of cases, and not
let public outrage go too far. In two high-profile cases the authorities went out of
their way to demonstrate that public outrage expressed online would not
necessarily affect or change court decisions.
What became known as the BMW case began in 2003, when, in the
northeast city of Harbin, a peasant accidentally drove his onion-cart into a parked
BMW. The driver, a woman named Su Xiuwen, got out, and argued with the
driver of the onion cart, Dai Yiquan. After bystanders intervened, she retreated
to the car. She then unexpectedly put the car into gear, striking and killing Liu
Zhongxai, Dai’s wife, and injuring several others.
At trial in Harbin, the issue was whether Su had intentionally or
accidentally put the car into forward gear. After a trial notable for its lack of
eyewitness testimony, the court ruled the killing an accident and imposed a
suspended sentence.
As news of the story spread, the Internet reaction was overwhelming.
Sina.com, a leading web portal, reported receiving more than 200,000 web
postings on the case -- even more than the total number of postings regarding the
SARS crisis earlier in 2003.85 The class difference between owners of the BMW
81

See, e.g., Ouyang Bin [LZ-31], supra note 41 (arguing that the death sentence was reinstated
due to the combined efforts of internet and print media); Guo Liang [LZ-34], supra note 40.
82
See, e.g., Shenyang “Heidao Bazhu” Liu Yong Bei Panchu Sixing [Shenyang “Godfather of
Black Society” Liu Yong Is Sentenced to Death], http://news.sina.com.cn/z/liuyongsy/index.shtml
(last visited Sept. 27, 2005) [LP-47]; Shenyang Liu Yong An [Shenyang Liu Yong Case],
http://news.sina.com.cn/z/liuyongsy/1.shtml (lasted visited Mar. 1, 2006) [LZ-LY5].
83
Shenyang “Godfather of Black Society” Liu Yong Is Sentenced to Death [LP-47], supra note 82.
84
Xiao Yuhen, Panchu Liu Yong Sixing Ye Shi Yulun Jiandu De Shengli [Sentencing Liu Yong To
Death Is Also the Victory of Public Opinion Supervision], XINLANG [SINA], Dec. 22, 2003,
http://tech.sina.com.cn/me/2003-12-22/1447271669.shtml [L Z-LY4].
85
“Baoma” Zhuangren An Wangshang Dianji Lü Weiju Di Yi, Chaoguo Feidian [The Case of
“BMW” Hitting People Gets the Most Internet Reading, Exceeding SARS], XINHUA WANG
[XINHUA WEB],
http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2004-01/08/content_1266893.htm [LZ-BMW5].
Sina first
reported on the case on December 31, 2003; ten days later it reported 220,000 online comments.
Guo
Liang
[LZ-34],
supra
note
40;
see
also
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and the onion-cart drove public outrage, as did the questionable nature of the trial.
Many speculated that political connections of Su, the wife of a prominent
businessman in Harbin, influenced the outcome.
In January 2004 authorities announced that the case would be reexamined.
But the authorities at the same time banned further reporting on the case and
ordered websites to terminate and remove discussions of the case. There seemed
to be a clear effort to establish that internet rage would not overturn the verdict.
Three months later, official media announced that an investigation lead by
the Heilongjiang Province Communist Party’s Political-Legal Committee had
determined that the case had been correctly decided.
Although official
statements declared that the court’s decision in the BMW case had been upheld,
observers reported that in fact a number of persons involved in the case were
sanctioned internally. 86 The sanctions were never announced publicly. 87 The
message can be read several ways. One possibility was that authorities did want
to protect Su, the driver of the BMW. But the clear message was that
malfeasance will be handled internally, and that internet anger can not always be
allowed to dictate Party or court decisions.
A similar story came in 2005, when web sites carried extensive discussion
of the case of Wang Binyu.88 Wang, a migrant worker, was sentenced to death for
murdering four people, including his construction site foreman and three family
members. Wang’s case became famous nationwide following reports in the
Beijing News. 89 He was a symbol of the hardship and exploitation faced by
China’s millions of migrant workers. Wang killed his boss after he repeatedly
failed to pay him. Said Wang, “I want to die. When I am dead, nobody can
exploit me anymore. Right?”90
http://www.thebeijingnews.com/news/2005/0905/11@011747.html [LZ-BMW4] (describing the
on-line discussion forums of the case as “a miracle”).
86
Interview 2005-45.
87
The driver in the case, Su Xiuwen, was subject to punishment but was not jailed. But the
investigation into the case apparently led to other misdeeds being uncovered. Thus press reports
stated that as a result of the investigation into the BMW case, another woman, Han Guizhi, was
removed from office and tried for corruption. Yuan Heilongjiang Zhengxie Zhuyi Han Guizhi Bei
Mianzhi Qianhou [The Former Heilongjiang President of the Heilongjiang Political Consultative
Conference Han Guizhi is Removed from Office], XIN JING BAO [THE BEIJING NEWS], June 24,
2004, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2004-06-24/03373503585.shtml [LZ-BMW1]; Han Guizhi Jiang
Zai Beijing Di Yi Zhongyuan Shoushen Jiazhong Shu Ren Bei Shuanggui [Han Guizhi Will be
Tried in Beijing First Intermediate Court, Several Family Members Have Been “Double
Specified”],
FAZHI
WANBAO
[LEGAL
EVENING
NEWS],
Mar.
24,
2005,
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2005-03-24/14156183789.shtml [LZ-BMW 3].
88
For examples, see Siqiu Zuihou Yuanwang: Guanzhu Nongmin Gong [Last Wish of a Criminal
Waiting for Execution: Paying Attention to Migrant Workers], XIN JING BAO [THE BEIJING NEWS],
Sept. 5, 2005, http://www.thebeijingnews.com/news/2005/0905/11@011747.html [LZ-W1]; Yuan
Xiaobing, Shendu; Mingong Wang Binyu De Nu Yu Bei [In Depth: Peasant Worker Wang Binyu’s
Anger and Sorrow], NANFANG DUSHI BAO [SOUTHERN METROPOLITAN DAILY], Sept. 11, 2005,
http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/southnews/tszk/nfdsb/sd/200509110183.asp [LZ-W2].
89
Last Wish of a Criminal Waiting for Execution [LZ-W1], supra note 88.
90
Yuan Xiaobing [LZ-W2].
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Many online postings and articles took Wang’s side, and argued that he
should be spared.91 As with the BMW case, however, online discussion largely
stopped following a Central Propaganda Department instruction. 92 Wang was
then quietly executed. Although news of his execution was posted to the official
China Court News website the day after his execution,93 domestic media did not
report on it. Only after the case received attention in the New York Times did the
domestic media report on Wang’s death.94
***
From these leading cases, and from interviews with journalists, judges,
and academics, we can describe a general pattern. First, the growth of the
internet has made it more difficult for courts to conceal information about cases,
and more likely that misdeeds will be noticed and reported. Judges state that
courts find it hard to conceal information about cases, which increases pressure on
courts to handle cases according to law. Courts and Party-state officials that
oversee the courts cannot be assured of their ability to silence discussion of cases
simply by issuing an instruction banning further reporting. As we’ve seen, the
three most famous cases of internet influence -- the Sun Zhigang, Liu Yong, and
BMW cases -- all demonstrate how online coverage or discussion can encourage
Party officials to intervene. In all of the cases, reports in the print media, reposted
to major internet portals, were enough to set off a chain-reaction
This, in turn, has led to a new type of Party-state intervention into the
operations of the legal system. The interventions come in response to internet
outrage, and are marked by a determination to resolve the matter quickly: in the
Sun case, with the rapid arrest and trial of suspects and then a choreographed
closed trial; in the Liu Yong case with the Supreme People's Court apparently
being ordered to rehear the case; and in the BMW case with the investigation of
the case by Party authorities.95 At the same time, Party propaganda authorities
curtail any further discussion of the cases other than by officially-approved
sources -- generally by requiring that the media only use dispatches from the
Xinhua News Agency.96 Propaganda authorities also order web portals to remove
or ban discussion of the cases: one list of terms automatically filtered by one
91

Fu Yingji [LZ-59], supra note 55.
Id. [LZ-59].
93
Yang Chao, Wang Binyu Guyi Sharen An Er Shen Xuanpan [The Appeal in Wang Binyu’s
Intentional Homicide Case is Decided], ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG [CHINA COURT WEB], Oct. 20,
2005, http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=181959 [LZ-W3].
94
Yuan Xiaobing, Wang Binyu Sha Ren [Wang Binyu Killed People], NANFANG DUSHI BAO
[SOUTHERN
METROPOLITAN
DAILY],
Dec.
31,
2005,
http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/southnews/zt/rdzt/zgxwcd/200512310024.asp (reporting on
Wang’s execution) [LZ-W4].
95
“The Case of Nie Shubin Being Killed Wrongfully” is Pending, [LZ-57], supra note 51.
96
Cf. Fu Yingji, [LZ-59], supra note 55, (discussing restrictions on reporting in the Nie Shubin
and Wang Binyu cases).
92
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Chinese blog service included both “Nie Shubin” and “Wang Binyu.”97 In the
final step, official media declare the interventions and resulting decisions to be
successful examples of authorities responding to public opinion.
Given the possibility of public scrutiny leading to unstoppable pressure,
political intervention, and even possible punishment for judges, courts are taking
some preemptive action to better control information. In recent years courts have
taken steps to restrict media coverage of cases, requiring reporters to obtain court
approval prior to attending trials. Courts frequently either draft articles about
cases in their court for the local media, or require that all such articles are
screened by court officials prior to publication. Courts have also retaliated
against negative coverage, with both courts and individual judges filing
defamation lawsuits in response to critical media coverage. In addition, court
propaganda or research departments monitor online discussions of cases involving
individual courts,98 sometimes via daily searches to locate discussions of the cases
in the media or in discussion forums.99 Finally, while it is hard to say for sure,
courts may be more inclined to decide cases in ways that are less likely to inflame
the public, which in the criminal context often means applying harsh sanctions.
The result is a strange, tense, and slightly rivalrous relationship among the
courts and the media, major internet providers, and the Party-State. As we’ve
seen, the courts fear media reports that might result in popular outrage and
political intervention. The media, meanwhile, must balance the risk of
punishment if they go too far in reporting on sensitive cases with their desire to
maximize profit through aggressive or sensational reporting. Party-state officials
are concerned with maintaining stability -- even at the cost of undermining their
claims to be emphasizing rule of law. Unfortunately, this complex web of
relationships cannot help but sometimes distract from resolving disputes fairly.
The fears of media attention, public reaction, and Party-state intervention do make
the legal system more accountable, just not necessarily to the parties before the
court.
***
Until this point, the paper has focused on communications practices
between the courts and other actors, including the media, public, and Party-state
officials. We now turn to the results of interviews with Chinese judges, to see
how their communications practices have been affected by the internet revolution.

97

Keywords Used to Filter Web Content, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2006, available at
https://w8.bwanana.com/dmirror/http/www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/02/18/AR2006021800554.html.
98
Interview 2005-10.
99
In other areas, however, judges say that they are not concerned about internet discussion of
pending cases, Interview 2005-10 -- perhaps because there is little such discussion in the less
developed areas of China’s interior. See, e.g., Interview 2005-12 (stating that there is little online
discussion of cases in Xi’an).
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B. Communications Practices within the Chinese Judiciary
1. Traditional Communications Practices. -- To understand how matters
are changing, we must first describe the traditional communication practices
within the Chinese judiciary. To generalize, Chinese judges have operated in a
context in which they had limited access to horizontal information -- information
about how other similarly-situated courts were doing their jobs. Instead their
primary source of guidance for handling novel or difficult cases has been vertical
-- consultation with superiors, either within the court hierarchy or in other Partystate institutions. Chinese judges have also operated in an environment in which
their access to information is restricted in some respects and uninhibited in others.
On the one hand, courts have often had limited access to legal materials and the
decisions of other judges. Chinese judges not only knew very little about how
judges elsewhere were handling cases; in impoverished rural areas they may also
have lacked easy access to laws, regulations, SPC interpretations and other
normative documents. On the other hand, judges have been relatively uninhibited
in seeking advice on how to handle cases from colleagues, superiors, Party-state
officials, or academics and experts outside the courts.
Since the start of the reform era in 1978, China’s judges have worked in a
historically unusual legal environment. During the Mao era, and particularly
during the Cultural Revolution, many legal institutions were neglected, left to
play minor roles or used primarily as political tools of the state. During the
Cultural Revolution, the legal system ceased to function in any recognizable form.
Since 1978, great efforts have been made to improve and reform the Chinese legal
system. Much of the statutory law was either rewritten or drafted anew. Judges,
consequently, have been called on to apply a huge number of new laws, which
have often been vague or unclear. Yet despite reform, in many regions judges
have continued to lack even the basic legal materials required to resolve cases.
What might strike a foreign observer as the most important sources of guidance -legal education, the laws themselves, and decisions of other courts -- have often
been unavailable or at the least lacking in detail.
Limited access to information has not meant that judges confronting hard
cases have had no other sources for guidance. First, within individual courts,
adjudication committees provide guidance (or decide outright) difficult or
sensitive cases. 100 These adjudication committees, which include high ranking
judges from the court, and sometimes procurators (who participate in discussions
in some criminal cases, but apparently do not have voting power on the
committee), 101 serve as a venue for discussing challenging or sensitive cases.
100

The range of cases considered by adjudication committees varies substantially. In most courts
adjudication committees consider any cases in which the three-judge panel responsible for the case
can not agree on an outcome. In some courts adjudication committees consider all cases where a
defendant has been sentenced to life in prison or death, as well as all cases in which the panel
decided not to impose a prison sentence on a defendant.
101
In China, procurators serve both as the prosecution and as supervisors over the legal system.
Technically the procuracy is a judicial branch of equal rank to the courts. They are not only the
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This practice (which has both critics and supporters in China) results in cases that
are decided in the first instance by judges who have played no role in hearing the
case. It can be said to reflect the fact that the concept of judicial independence in
China refers to courts, not individual judges. In any case, in addition to the
formal adjudication committee, judges frequently consult informally with their
peers and superiors within courts. Court presidents, who are the most powerful
figures within individual courts (and who often lack formal legal training), play a
particularly important role in guiding decisions in cases that are perceived to be
sensitive or difficult.
Second, lower court judges have also traditionally sought guidance on
difficult cases by seeking advice of the superior court through the process known
as qingshi, or “requesting instruction.” Judges encountering a difficult or novel
question can contact the higher-level court -- often by telephone or in person -- to
discuss how the case should be handled in the court of first instance. The qingshi
practice, which bears some resemblance to an informal interlocutory appeal, has
been criticized for eliminating the point of an appeals process.102 However, it
continues to be an important mechanism for judges seeking guidance in difficult
or potentially sensitive cases.103 Chinese judges are evaluated based in part on
whether their decisions are affirmed or reversed on appeal; a judge who gets a
decision “wrong” can be fined or, in serious cases, removed from office. It is thus
easy to understand why judges might seek guidance from a higher-level court
prior to issuing a decision.
Third, China is officially a civil law system, and has no binding system of
precedent as such. However, official advice as to how cases should be handled is
disseminated through public normative documents issued by the Supreme
People’s Court -- ranging from official interpretations of laws to replies to
questions or explanations concerning decisions in specific cases -- or by nonpublic instructions issued by the SPC or by provincial high courts. Judges also
learn of new legal information and of representative cases through official
publications. These include the People’s Court News, the official newspaper of
the court system, which frequently highlights interesting or noteworthy cases
handled by lower courts, and the Gazette of the Supreme People’s Court, which
publishes official decisions and cases from the SPC. Numerous collections of
cases have also been published, some under the guidance of the SPC that are
designed to highlight “representative cases” that courts should follow, and others
by academics or individual courts. A few for-profit websites now also provide
prosecution, but also have the power to force courts to retry cases where the procuracy thinks the
courts got it wrong. Renmin Fayuan Zuzhi Fa [Organization Law of the People’s Courts] arts. 12,
14, 15 (effective Jan. 1, 1980, as amended Sept. 2, 1983，and October 31, 2006).
102
See, e.g., “Faguan Chule Falü Jiu Meiyou Bie De Shangsi” [“The Judges Have No Boss Other
Than Law”], XIN JING BAO [THE BEIJING NEWS] (Dec. 3, 2003), available at
http://news.xinhuanet.com/comments/2003-12/03/content_1210980.htm [LZ-19].
103
Some courts in China have taken recent steps to restrict the use of qingshi procedures, requiring
that all such requests for guidance come in writing, or come from lower court adjudication
committees (rather than individual judges).
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collections of cases. 104 There is no formal system for publication of cases in
China, however, or mechanism for searching the cases that are made publicly
available. Thus with the exception of information in the People’s Court News
(which prior to the internet was not searchable), other similar publications, or the
occasional published collection of cases, judges had little information about how
to handle cases other than that passed down to them from superior courts.
Finally, senior judges in courts may also discuss cases with the local Party
Political-Legal Committee, or with representatives from local people’s congresses
or government. This is particularly true in serious criminal cases, in cases that
have aroused widespread public attention, or in cases that touch on important
local interests.
This model, which depends heavily on vertical consultation with superior
courts or political officials, continues to predominate. However today the internet
is changing how many Chinese judges do their job. In this first section we
canvass how at least some judges use the internet in deciding cases, including
some of the uses that may seem unusual from the perspective of practice in other
nations.
2. New Communications Practices. -- Within China the use of the internet
by individual judges is beginning to transform communications practices within
the judiciary, and consequently how law is both used and applied in China.
Judges who once worked in isolation, without either easy access to national laws
or information about how similar cases were handled elsewhere, now are able to
access not only the law on the books, but also how such laws are being applied
and debated elsewhere.
The Chinese judges interviewed for this article overwhelmingly
commented that they use the internet to conduct research to assist them in
handling cases -- especially in hard or novel cases. Perhaps the most interesting
outcome of such usage is the slow development of what resembles a non-binding
system of precedent in the Chinese legal system.
Judges state that they are
developing “unwritten precedent” regarding how to handle cases.105 They note
that doing so helps to reduce their workload when they encounter new legal
issues. 106 Judges explain that they do not look to other courts’ decisions as
“precedent,” but rather only for the purposes of reference, or cankao.107 But even
this non-binding “precedent” may strongly influence decision-making.
The reported use of informal precedent dovetails with a rise in the interest
in using precedent in the Chinese legal system. Since early 2002, the Zhengzhou
Zhongyuan District Court has experimented with a “precedent decision” system
whereby the court selects important cases as “models.”108 Similarly, the Supreme
104

Some of these sites claim to have tens of thousands of cases. In our interviews, however, not a
single judge mentioned ever having consulted such commercial websites to research cases.
105
Interview 2005-85.
106
Interview 2005-12.
107
Interview 2005-12.
108
See Constructing a Case-Law System with Chinese Characteristic? A Precedent-Decision
System Emerges from Zhengzhou, CHINA NEWSWEEK, Sept. 6, 2002, available at
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People’s Court has within recent years begun referring to its model decisions as
“legal precedent.” However, the internet-driven use of informal precedent
exceeds the scope of these experiments.
Some of the greatest consequences of these developments may be for the
more remote parts of China. For example, judges from places like Qinghai
Province, in western China, explained that they frequently consult court web sites
in more developed areas of China to see how they have handled particular legal
issues.109
This is a break from traditional practice. Judges encountering new legal
questions have traditionally sought assistance from their superiors, either in their
own court, or in higher-ranking courts. The growth of the internet suggests that
courts may increasingly be able to look horizontally, to courts elsewhere in China,
whereas in the past they would have sought assistance from those above them.
Over the long-term, the development of an informal system of precedent
may significantly change the Chinese legal system. It may lead to a greater
confidence born of national consistency, and the authority of acting in concert.
That may in turn lead to greater institutional security and autonomy, as judges
rely on the strength of the judgment of others, as opposed to mere personal
judgment.
Yet the internet is not only permitting the development of horizontal
interactions among judges. The internet is also a mechanism for strengthening
existing vertical relationships in the courts, and perhaps even control over
individual judges by superiors within the courts. Numerous courts in China have
established internal court networks, designed to facilitate court work, improve
efficiency, and also strengthen oversight over individual judges. In sum, internal
networks show how the internet may also serve the Party-state’s interests in
control.
We first explore ways in which judges are using the external web, and
then turn to the impact of internal court networks.
i. Finding Cases. -- The best place for Chinese judges to find useful cases
is, ironically, sometimes outside of the courthouse. Few judges in China have
access to the external internet (the internet as it exists in China) from work, as
many courts do not permit judges other than those in court propaganda
departments to access the external web from work.110 In other courts only the

http://www.chinanewsweek.com.cn/2002-09-06/1/357.html (Center for Chinese Legal Studies
translation).
109
See, e.g., Interview 2005-9.
110
Interview 2005-10, Interview 2005-13; Interview 2005-18; see also Interview 2005-51 (stating
that at a district court in Beijing judges are not allowed to go online from their offices, but that
there is a computer at the court that judges can use to go online if they need to do so); Interview
2005-58 (stating that judges at the Beijing High People’s Court do not have access to the external
web from their offices, but that they can go to the court library if they want to go online). In
economically well-off areas of Jiangsu Province, some offices have two computers -- one for the
internal network and one for the external network. Interview 2005-63.

11/10/06 Draft

CHINA’S NETWORK JUSTICE

31

court president has access to the external web.111 Such restrictions may derive
both from concerns that judges will waste time online, and from concerns that
judges will use the internet to reveal confidential or secret information.112 But in
some courts access to the internet also appears to be a sign of status -- akin to
having a car and driver -- with only the highest ranking judges being permitted to
go online from work.
Despite these restrictions, a great many judges say that they use the
external network to aid their decision–making, particularly to research legal
questions and to see how other courts have handled cases similar to those before
them.113 In the central Chinese city of Xi’an, judges use the internet to consult
cases decided by the Supreme People’s Court, and by the Shaanxi Provincial High
People’s Court, as well as decisions from other courts.114 In Shenyang, judges
note that they consult both the web sites of other courts and media reports for
information on cases.115 Even in areas in which courts lack computers judges
state that they frequently conduct online research when they encounter difficult
cases. 116 Some judges have access to the internet at home; others go to web
cafes.117
As one judge put it, “the effect is huge.”118 A judge working in a rural
county court in central China (which lacks both an internal network and access to
the external web) gave the example of determining how to apportion blame in
traffic accidents when both sides share liability. Going online, judges “found that
in Guangdong there is a standard for the whole province for this.”119 Although
not in Guangdong and thus not obligated to use the standard, the court decided to
use the Guangdong rule. “In the past we only looked at cases in our court” for
guidance, commented the judge. Now the court looks elsewhere.120
On the external internet, judges rely on the same tools that other
participants in the legal system use to build legal arguments. Summaries of cases
on China Court Web and the websites of individual courts, media reports, and
other sources give judges an idea as to how cases have been decided. Judges also
frequent prominent academic web sites, including the Civil and Commercial Law
Website of Renmin University.121 Judges say that it is often easier to locate legal
111

Interview 2005-64. In other locales vice presidents also have access.
Interview 2005-10; Interview 2005-77.
113
Interview 2005-9; Interview 2005-13; Interview 2005-85; Interview 2006-36; Interview 200676; see also Interview 2005-12 (stating that when judges encounter new types of cases they will
sometimes go online at home to see how other courts have handled the issue); Interview 2005-51
(judge stating that he will sometimes search online for information regarding how other courts
have handled similar cases).
114
Interview 2005-10; Interview 2005-12.
115
Interview 2005-64; Interview 2005-65; Interview 2005-70; Interview 2005-85.
116
Interview 2005-95; Interview 2005-96.
117
Interview 2005-95; Interview 2006-49.
118
Interview 2006-34.
119
Interview 2006-35.
120
Id.
121
Interview 2005-65; Interview 2005-70.
112
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materials on the web that on internal court networks, which they say are often
incomplete or are infrequently updated.122 Simply making it easier for judges to
locate binding law is an important development: in the past, judges often had no
easy way to locate relevant laws and other materials. As one judge explained,
courts often have one book for hundreds of people, making it difficult for
individual judges to actually locate materials.123
The most significant examples of internet research are in cases where the
law is uncertain, or in which judges face difficult legal questions.124 Judges state
they routinely search web sites of other courts for examples of cases similar to
those before them.125 For example, a judge specializing in intellectual property
cases in Beijing stated that judges hearing such cases will often look online to see
how similar cases have been handled elsewhere, including overseas.126
Judges are not the only ones using the internet in this way. Lawyers also
say they use the internet to conduct research, and that they often will provide
judges with printouts of materials they locate online, including information about
similar cases elsewhere. 127 One lawyer recounted how, in a case in which his
client had been sentenced to death in the first instance, he located a newspaper
report regarding a case from the same city in which a defendant in a similar case
had been sentenced to fifteen years in prison, not death. The appellate court then
reduced the sentence.128 Public interest lawyers say that they have used web sites
to link plaintiffs and lawyers who are bringing similar cases nationwide. 129
Lawyers say that law firm websites can also be useful for gathering information
about prior cases -- and that they sometimes will print out materials from such
sites to provide to judges.130 Likewise procurators say that they frequently use the
internet to conduct research where the law is unclear, in particular in determining
the appropriate crime with which to charge a defendant.
Some courts appear to be particularly important sources of precedent.
Thus, for example, intellectual property divisions at the intermediate courts in
Beijing, or in Beijing’s Haidian District (home to many technology companies),
are seen as being influential.131 Likewise, judges in the interior say that they often
122

Interview 2005-55.
Interview 2005-54.
124
Interview 2005-65 (stating that judges in Liaoning routinely look online when confronted with
new cases); Interview 2005-78 (stating that judges frequently use the internet when they encounter
issues that existing law do not clearly govern); Interview 2005-84 (same); Interview 2005-82
(stating that judges will look online for cases, news reports, and academic articles when they
encounter new legal issues).
125
Interview 2005-17.
126
Interview 2005-49; Interview 2005-104; see also Interview 2005-58 (stating that Beijing High
People’s Court judges frequently use the internet to look for cases from overseas); Interview 200570 (stating that judges in Changchun will use the internet to research developments overseas)
127
Interview 2006-31; Interview 2006-45.
128
Interview 2006-17.
129
Interview 2006-25.
130
Interview 2006-37.
131
Interview 2006-4.
123

11/10/06 Draft

CHINA’S NETWORK JUSTICE

33

look for guidance to courts in Beijing and Shanghai -- where judges are widely
regarded as being better qualified than in many other areas of China.132
The practice of using the internet to look for useful precedent or other
guidance is among the most potentially significant developments in judicial
communications. However, for the most part, what it does is mimic what we see
in other legal systems, both civil and common law. In the next section we discuss
more novel ways in which Chinese courts are using the internet.
ii. Innovations. -- Some of the ways courts use the internet in China may
strike a Western observer as surprising or unusual. Here we discuss several
examples where judges have used the network in ways that appear distinct from
the rest of the world. The first examples involve using court web sites for public
relations purposes.
In 2004, the Shiquan County Court in Shaanxi Province came under fire
from local media when it dismissed the case of migrant worker Xu Dengkai for
being eight minutes late for a hearing. Xu contracted silicosis from work at a
local factory and sued to challenge a labor arbitration award. The labor
arbitration committee had ordered that the defendant factory pay him 6,200 yuan
(about $775), while Xu argued that he was entitled to 217,206 yuan (about
$27,000).133 On the date of the hearing, however, Xu arrived slightly late.134 By
the time he arrived, the court had already dismissed his case for failure to appear,
forcing Xu to forfeit 14,000 yuan ($1750) in court filing fees that he had already
paid.135
The Huashang News, a leading commercial newspaper in the provincial
capital, Xi’an, wrote an editorial entitled “The Legal System Should Not Be
Frozen.” The newspaper argued that dropping the case was an unduly harsh
punishment for a litigant who was five minutes late.136 It pointed out that the
plaintiff had to travel by train from outside the mountainous county to arrive at

132

Interview 2006-67.
Da Yao Anjian Tongbao 2005 (Di Yi Qi) [Notice of Big and Important Cases 2005 (no. 1)], Feb.
24, 2005, http://www.aaawww.net/select/selectl.php3?id=372207&userid=24245 [LP-32].
134
Mingong Dagong Huan Xifei Suopei Chesu, Zhengfu Guanyuan Shexian Cangu? [Peasant
Worker who Got Silicosis Through Working Withdraws Suit for Compensation, are Government
Officials Suspected of Owning Stocks?], HUASHANG BAO [HUASHANG NEWS], Sept. 18, 2005,
available at http://news.huash.com/gb/news/2005-09/18/content_2222951.htm [LP-34]; “Fazhi”
Buying Leng Bing Bing [“The Legal System” Should Not be Frozen], HUASHANG BAO
[HUASHANG NEWS], Jan. 12, 2005, available at http://news.huash.com/gb/news/200501/12/content_1564512.htm [LP-43].
135
Zhi Yin Kaiting 5 Fenzhong Nei Wei Dao, Hanyin Mingong Suopei Zao Chesu [Because of Five
Minutes Late for Court, Hanyin Peasant Worker is Ruled to Have Withdrawn His Claim for
Compensation],
HUASHANG
WANG
[HUASHANG
WEB],
available
at
http://news.huash.com/gb/news/2005-01/12/content_1564511.htm[LP-44]; Notice of
Big and Important Cases in 2005 [LP-32], supra note 133. In most civil cases in China plaintiffs
are required to pay a filing fee that is a specified percentage of the amount in controversy.
136
Legal System” Should Not be Frozen [LP-43], supra note 134; Peasant Worker Withdraws Suit
[LP-34], supra note 134.
133
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the court by 8:30 a.m. It also wrote that the worker was in poor health as a result
of the injuries he had suffered at work.137
The court, slighted, turned to the internet to defend itself online. Its first
act was to release a report that argued that it had handled the case fully in
compliance with the law.138 Next, court judges responded to and debated with
critics on the court’s public internet message board.139 One comment posted to
the court’s electronic bulletin board urged the court to admit that its handling of
the case had been incorrect. In response, a court official wrote that because the
case was still on appeal it could not be said to have been incorrectly decided. In
another exchange, a posting complained that the case was “not readable.” The
court thanked the poster of the message for the criticism, and stated that the court
needed to continue to strengthen its ability “to serve social stability and
development.”140 Some of the court’s postings were identified as coming from
the court president, while others appeared to come from other court officials.
Later on, the court backed down, and permitted the plaintiff to refile the
case without having to pay the court fees a second time. Without mentioning the
controversy or criticism, the court posted a report on the case on its website as an
example of how the court was working to further the “advanced education” policy
of the Communist Party. The court posted a picture of Xu to the court’s
homepage, with a caption stating, “Our Court Carries out Judicial Assistance in
the Case of Xu Dengkui.”141 The court noted that it had taken account of the
plaintiff’s status as a worker from outside the county, and had therefore decided to
waive the court fee and schedule an afternoon hearing so that Xu would be able to
attend. The report also stated that the court had been praised by the parties to the
case and the media.142
The Xu case is just one example of how courts use their websites for
public relations purposes. Hundreds of Chinese courts -- ranging from the
Supreme People’s Court to rural county courts -- have created public websites.143
137

Notice of Big and Important Cases in 2005 [LP-32], supra note 133; “Legal System” Should
Not be Frozen [LP-43], supra note 134.
138
Kan Ankang Shiquan Fayuan Zenyang Lueduo Nongmingong [See How Ankang Shiquan
County
Court
Plunders
Peasant
Worker],
http://bbs.sxtvs.com/printpage.asp?BoardID=34&ID=48266 (last visited Sept. 27, 2005) [LP-45]
(bbs chatroom). The court argued that the plaintiff had failed to provide an excuse for being late,
and thus the court’s action was justified under China’s Civil Procedure Law. Id.
139
Interview
2005-16;
Shanxi
Shiquan
County
Court
Message
Board,
http://www.aaawww.net/bbs/index2.php?userid=24245&c= [LZ-18].
140
See id.
141
http://www.sqfy.com/index.php3?file=4.
142
Shiquan Xian Renmin Fayuan Zai Baochi Gongchan Dangyuan Xianjin Xing Jiaoyu [Shiquan
County People’s Court Maintains the Advanced Teaching of the Communist Party],
http://www.aaawww.net/select/select1.php3?id=378962&userid=24245 (last visited Oct. 13, 2005)
[LP-31].
143
As of August 2006, the official China Court Web site included links to 110 other court websites
in 22 provinces. Fayuan Zaixian [Courts Online], ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG [CHINA COURT
WEB], http://www.chinacourt.org/fyzx/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2006) [LZ-4]. The list, however, is
not comprehensive. Zhongguo Fayuan Wang Jianjie Ji Jianwang Xuzhi [Brief Introduction of
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Court public websites frequently include information such as an overview of court
work and personnel, news from the court, and discussion forums.144 Although
urban courts were first to establish web sites, even courts in some rural areas have
sites that provide information about the court, judges, and cases.145
Court websites focus on providing information about the court, largely to
educate the public about such work, and to achieve other propaganda goals. The
Supreme People’s Court’s web site, for example, includes news on the court,
primarily focused on the activities of court leaders; an introduction to each branch
of the court and to each judge on the court; explanations, interpretations, replies
and other normative documents issued by the court; selected decisions of the court
(but none from the past two years); model decisions from lower courts; and the
court’s annual work reports to the National People’s Congress.146 The website
makes it easier to access the same type of information that the court already
makes publicly available through the People’s Court News, the Court’s Gazette,
and regularly published books of selected decisions from lower courts.
Another important and widely read site is the China Court Web, which we
discussed above. 147 The China Court Web carries news articles regarding the
courts, laws and regulations, academic legal materials, and online discussion
forums and chatrooms regarding legal matters. The China Court Web is a
particularly important place for judges to read about what other courts are doing -and to help find the informal precedent discussed above. The site is run by the
People’s Court News, the official newspaper of the Supreme People’s Court, and
thus is directly under the supervision of the Supreme People’s Court.148 The site
includes both content in the paper, and also a wide range of material that does not
make it into the print version.
Lower court web sites are similar. They focus on highlighting court work
and educating the public about such work, either through selected opinions from
cases or summaries of cases, and articles written by judges.149 Cases included on
China Court Web and Notice of Web Construction], Zhongguo Fayuan Wang [China Court Web],
http://www.chinacourt.org/other/detail.php (last visited Feb. 21, 2006) [LZ-5]. For example,
although an internet search found that five courts in Shanghai had public web sites, only one was
listed on the SPC website.
144
See, e.g., Ankang Shi Zhongji Renmin Fayuan [Ankang Intermediate Court],
http://www.akfy.org.cn (web site of Ankang Municipal Intermediate Court) [LP-30].
145
Shaanxi Sheng Shiquan Xian Renmin Fayuan [Shaanxi Province Shiquan County People’s
Court], http://www.sqfy.com/index.php3?file=4.php [LP-33]; Interview 2005-14; see also
Xingguo Xian Renmin Fayuan [Xingguo County People’s Court], http://xgxfy.chinacourt.org/
(Jiangxi Province Xingguo County Court); Hebei Sheng Gu’an Xian Renmin Fayuan [Hebei
Province Gu’an County People’s Court], http://gaxfy.chinacourt.org/; Shangdong Sheng Kenli
Xian Renmin Fayuan [Shangdong Province Kenli County People’s Court]
http://klfy.chinacourt.org/.
146
The website also includes links to pages covering court history and an online video, but both
links are empty. The site appears to be under construction, which may also explain the small
number of cases included on the site.
147
http://www.chinacourt.org/.
148
See Guanyu Women [About Us], at http://www.chinacourt.org/other/aboutus.php.
149
See, e.g., http://www.jsfy.gov.cn/aljx/index.asp.
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web sites are generally selected by court propaganda officials with a view to
highlighting noteworthy or new cases.150
Few courts post all or even many of their decisions online. Indeed, only
one court is known to have done so: in 2000, the Guangzhou Maritime Court
announced that all of its decisions would be made available online.151 The court
website now includes 777 cases decided between 2001 and 2005.152 Other courts
have similarly pledged to make all cases available online, or all intellectual
property cases,153 but such promises appear to have gone unfulfilled.154 Most
courts continue to post only a small number of selected decisions or case
descriptions.

150

Interview 2005-63.
Guangzhou Haishi Fayuan Panjueshu Shangwang [Guangzhou Maritime Court Posts
Decisions Online], ZHONGXINSHE WANGZHAN [CHINA NEWS AGENCY WEBSITE], Oct. 12, 2000,
available at http://dailynews.sina.com.cn/society/2000-10-12/134098.html [LZ-7].
152
Guangzhou Haishi Fayuan Caipan Wenshu [Guangzhou Maritime Court Judgment
Documents], http://www.gzhsfy.net/writ/index.php (last visited Feb. 22, 2006) [LZ-8]. In a 2005
article the court stated that it posts “announcements of cases, decisions and introductions to
judges” online. Guangzhou Haishi Fayuan [Guangzhou Maritime Court], Yunyong Xiandai Xinxi
Jishu, Jiaqiang Haishi Sifa Nengli Jianshe [Using Modern Information Technology, Enhancing
the Construction of Maritime Judicial Ability], ZHONGGUO SHEWAI SHANGSHI SHENPAN WANG
[CHINA
FOREIGN-RELATED
COMMERCIAL
TRIAL
WEB],
Nov.
23,
2005,
http://www.ccmt.org.cn/ss/news/show.php?cId=6356 [LZ-9].
153
For example, the Beijing High People’s Court reported in 2003 that all intellectual property
cases from all courts in Beijing would be published online. Beijing Gaoji Renmin Fayuan
[Beijing People’s High Court], Nüli Jiang Beijing Fayuan Wang Bancheng Tese Jingpin
Wangzhan [Endeavoring to Make the Beijing Court Net A Unique and Excellent Website],
ZHONGGUO
FAYUAN
WANG
[CHINA
COURT
WEB],
Nov
28,
2003,
http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=92553 [LZ-12]. As of February 2006, the web
site included 863 decisions -- although it is not clear whether that number reflects all intellectual
property cases in the municipality. Zhishi Chanquan Anjian [Intellectual Property Cases],
BEIJING FAYUAN WANG [BEIJING COURT WEB] (last visited Feb. 22, 2006),
http://bjgy.chinacourt.org/cpws/?sub=2 [LZ-13].
154
A 2003 report stated that Beijing courts would begin publishing all decisions from all three
levels of Beijing courts online, and would thus become the “first courts in the world” to do so. 11
Yue Beijing Fayuan Caipanshu Quanbu Shangwang, Cheng Shijie Shang Shouli [All Beijing Court
Decisions To Be Posted On-line from November, the First In the World to Do So], BEIJING YULE
XINBAO
[BEIJING
ENTERTAINMENT
NEWS],
Nov.
3,
2003,
available
at
http://www.edisc.com.cn/bike/viewnews.btml?id=16230 [LZ-14]. Yet as of February 2006 the
court’s web site listed only fifteen cases other than intellectual property cases. Qita Anjian [Other
Cases], Beijing Fayuan Wang [Beijing Court Web] (last visited Feb. 22, 2006),
http://bjgy.chinacourt.org/cpws/?sub=8 [LZ-15]; see also Guangdong Foshan Fayuan Panjueshu
Shangwang [Guangdong Foshan Court Putting Decisions Online], NANFANG DUSHI BAO
[SOUTHERN METROPOLITAN DAILY], July 1, 2003, available at http://tech.sina.com.cn/i/c/200307-01/1059204196.shtml (statement by Guangdong Foshan Intermediate court stating the types of
cases that will and will not be posted online) [LZ-16]. In an online essay, Peking University
professor He Weifang commented that he had found no court in China that made all decisions
available without modification online. See He Weifang, Panjueshu Shangwang Nan Zai He Chu?
[What’s the Difficulty of Putting Decisions On-line?], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL DAILY], Dec. 15, 2005,
available at http://law-thinker.com/show.asp?id=3025.
151
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Finally, as is common in the West, court sites also provide information to
potential litigants -- ranging from court rules and regulations, to explanations of
litigation procedures, to instructions on how to file cases and the risks and costs
involved in bringing lawsuits.155 Other courts include hearing times,156 selected
laws and regulations,157 instructions regarding the formulation of legal documents
and examples of such documents, 158 and court legal notices. 159 The Shenzhen
Intermediate Court includes a link to live broadcasts of selected court hearings,
although the system does not yet appear to be functional.160 Some court websites
also provide online mechanisms for citizens to file complaints about the court161 -although judges say few such complaints are filed.162
The growth of court websites reflects greater emphasis on public relations
and media management by China’s courts. 163 Courts have increasingly found
themselves coming under criticism, in particular from China’s newly
commercialized media. Courts are also coming into conflict with other Partystate institutions, including People’s Congresses, Procuratorates, and
administrative actors. Web sites provide a mechanism for improving the
reputations and images of courts, and perhaps thus for raising courts’ status in
their interactions with other official actors. Both the courts generally and
individual judges -- and in particular court presidents -- have an interest in raising
their profiles with higher-ranking leaders and with the public. The development
of public websites also reflects rhetorical commitment by the courts to the
importance of boosting transparency as a means for raising popular confidence in
the legal system, and to boosting legal knowledge among ordinary people so as to
make the courts more accessible. Internet sites, and in particular court news sites
such as the official China Court Web, do make an enormous amount of
information available, both to other judges and to the public. Yet like the
embrace of the internet by the Chinese Party-state more generally, the content on

155

Interview 2005-70; See also Beijing Fayuan Wang [Beijing Court Web],
http://bjgy.chinacourt.org/bjfy/
(introducing the basic functioning of courts in Beijing);
http://www.jsfy.gov.cn/sszn/sscx.htm (explaining litigation procedures on the Jiangsu Court
Network).
156
See, e.g., http://www.shezfy.com/OpenJudge.asp?show=week.
157
See, e.g., http://www.jsfy.gov.cn/sszn/cyfl.htm.
158
See, e.g., http://www.jsfy.gov.cn/sszn/szgs.htm.
159
See, e.g., http://www.shezfy.com/BulletDetail.asp?id=586.
160
Shenzhen Shi Zhongji Renmin Fayuan [Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court], Wang Shang
Kai Ting [Live Broadcasts of Court Hearings Online], http://www.szcourt.gov.cn/tszj.php.
161
See, e.g., Hainan Gaoyuan Xieshou Sike Gongzhu Ban’an Xin Pingtai [Hainan High Court
Constructs
New
Working
Platform
Hand
in
Hand
with
Cisco],
http://www.enet.com.cn/article/2004/1015/A20041015352752.shtml, Oct. 15, 2004 (reporting that
courts in Hainan Province have established an online web page through which citizens may report
on misconduct by court officials) [LP-6].
162
See, e.g., Interview 2005-70 (stating that a court a court in Changchun receives few complaints
via its web site).
163
Liebman, Watchdog or Demagogue?, supra note 20.
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courts’ public websites also suggest a greater emphasis on managing information
than on making such information publicly available.
iii. Judges Online. -- In 2006, in the Shiquan County People’s Court in
Shaanxi, an anonymous user posted a message advising the court to ignore a case
brought by an elderly woman against her granddaughter for financial support.
The message was posted to the court’s bbs chatroom, where court officials and
sometimes the court president respond to postings from the public (and where the
same court had previously defended itself in the Xu Denkai case). The poster
argued that that the plaintiff’s daughter, an alternative source of support, was alive
and in another town.164 The poster suggested that the grandmother was treating
the court president like her grandson -- expecting him to provide assistance
simply because she was elderly.
In a posted reply, a court official stated that the court would do their best
to handle the case (and would not ignore it). Later, the court president himself
responded. He stated that he had resolved the case by contacting the local civil
affairs bureau, and asked the bureau to provide financial support. The court
president acknowledged that it was not the court’s role to take such actions, but
stated that he had done so because the plaintiff was old, and because the plaintiff
recognized the importance of the courts.165
As this example shows, Chinese judges sometimes venture onto public
web sites to handle cases or discuss legal issues with members of the public.166
Judges even frequent discussions on public chatrooms, such as those on China
Court Web.167 Most judges state that they will not discuss actual cases before
them in online forums before such cases are decided. But there are also examples
of judges using such discussion boards to help determine how to best decide a
case. 168 In one example, a judge reported how a colleague had used online
discussions with legal scholars and ordinary people to “obtain consensus” as to
164

Shanxin
Shiquan
County
Court
Message
Board,
http://www.aaawww.net/bbs/index2.php?userid=24245&c=&infotype=&page=4 (last visited Feb.
27,
2006)
[LZ-27].
http://www.aaawww.net/bbs/index.php3?userid=24245&c=&infotype=&page=4;
http://www.aaawww.net/bbs/index2.php?userid=24245&c=.
165
Shanxin
Shiquan
County
Court
Message
Board,
http://www.aaawww.net/bbs/index2.php?userid=24245&c=&infotype=&page=4 (last visited Feb.
27, 2006) [LZ-27].
166
See, e.g., Shanghai: Yangpu Fayuan De Juyuwang BBS Tigao Gongzuo Xiaolü [Shanghai:
Yangpu Court Internal Network Enhances Efficiency], XINWEN CHENBAO [NEWS MORNING], Nov.
17, 2004, available at http://news.chinabyte.com/396/1876896.shtml (noting online meeting
between judges and “internet friends”) [LP-20].
167
Interview 2005-65. Judges sometimes self-identify as judges in their postings on bulletin
boards and in discussion forums. See, e.g., Yang Fan, Dui Yiqi Zhiwu Qinzhan Zui De Zhiyi
[Doubts on an Official Embezzlement Criminal Case], FAZHI LUNTAN [CHINA COURT WEB BBS],
Feb. 8, 2006, http://bbs.chinacourt.org/index.php?showtopic=139693 [LZ-20].
168
See, e.g., Wo Chengban Yijian Xingzheng Anjian [An Administrative Case that I’m
Adjudicating], FAZHI LUNTAN [CHINA COURT WEB BBS], Feb. 21, 2006,
http://bbs.chinacourt.org/index.php?showtopic=141739 (discussion by judge of case after decision,
requesting comments from other participants in a web discussion forum) [LZ-30].
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how a case should be handled. 169 He praised the use of online forums for
facilitating interactions between judges and the masses. And even judges who are
cautious about participating in online discussions regarding cases themselves said
that they nevertheless will sometimes consult such discussions when deciding
cases.170
Judges also use email to help decide cases. Judges in relatively remote
areas say that they sometimes email leading academics to ask their views of
particular legal issues.171 This already the practice in major cities like Beijing,
where judges frequently consult with academics when they encounter new or
difficult legal issues. The growth of the internet makes it easier for judges in less
developed areas to do the same.172 As an extension of the informal precedent
system we described earlier, judges say that they also sometimes use the internet
to locate courts that have encountered similar legal issues in the past, and then
telephone the judges who handled the cases to discuss how they reached their
decisions.173
Finally, in recent years, some judges have taken to blogging. Web sites
such as the China Court Web include blogging sections, where judges discuss a
variety of issues, including general views of their work and also sometimes
particular legal issues.174 Some judges appear to be using blogs to advance their
own careers -- writing in ways that highlight their own work (and how they
advance the Party-state’s goals for the legal system). Many of the blogs appear to
serve a mixture of education and propaganda goals. Thus, for example, Judge Wu
Jinpeng, a judge on the Henan Province High People’s court, used his blog to
describe the court proceedings in a capital case -- describing how the court held a
public hearing on appeal, and how such proceedings received praise from all
parties, including the defendant, who thanked the court for its fair handling of his
case. 175 Another judge, identified as Lan Cai, discussed cases ranging from a
dispute over an insurance contract, to a claim brought by local residents
challenging an administrative regulation. 176 A judge writing under the name
Judge Song Zhumei, used a blog to discuss criminal cases, asking, in one case,
whether particular facts should be treated as an accident or as giving rise to a
169

Interview 2005-82.
Interview 2006-34.
171
Interview 2005-65.
172
In Shenyang, the largest city in northeast China, an official document from the intermediate
court stated that consultations with experts should be done by telephone, letter, fax, email, orally,
through seminars and lectures, or through other appropriate means. Shenyang Shi Zhongji Renmin
Fayuan Zhuanjia Zixuntuan Gongzuo Banfa [Shenyang Municipality Intermediate People’s Court
Expert Consultation Group Working Methods], Nov. 17, 2004, available at
http://cdfy.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=1386 [LZ-26]. The document, however, only
refers to cases in which an official decision has been taken by the court to request the views of an
expert; in reality judges in China also consult informally with outside experts.
173
Interview 2005-49; Interview 2005-51; Interview 2005-77.
174
See http://blog.chinacourt.org/ (homepage for blogs on the official China Court Web site).
175
http://blog.chinacourt.org/wp-profile1.php?p=34042&author=130.
176
http://blog.chinacourt.org/wp-profile1.php?cat=3&author=1494.
170
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charge of criminal negligence.177 And a judge writing under the name Jia Mu
used a blog to discuss a range of civil cases, including a claim of harassment via a
cell phone message and a medical malpractice case.178
All of these cases appeared to be examples of already decided cases -judges do not appear to blog about pending cases. Moreover, none of the judges
interviewed for this article mentioned blogs as an important source of information
in deciding cases. This is not surprising: the use of blogs in China has exploded
during the period in which we conducted our research. But it does appear that
blogs are emerging as another important mechanism through which judges both
share information about cases before them, and perhaps also interact with the
public and the legal community regarding interesting or novel cases.
In sum, Chinese judges are experimenting with a variety of new ways of
using the internet to either handle their legal duties or conduct public relations.
The long-term implications of these activities are not clear. Nevertheless, China
may serve as an interesting case study for the rest of the world.
3. Internal Networks. -- Use of the external internet and the development
of court public websites represent just one aspect of how internet technology is
changing China’s courts. One reason most judges are not able to go on the
external internet from work is that many Chinese courts have constructed internal
court networks (another is that many basic level courts lack computers).
The developments we describe above regarding how judges use the
internet have gone largely unnoticed in academic and media writings in China.179
The Chinese media have, however, covered in detail the development of internal
court networks -- networks that can be accessed only by court personnel. These
networks, known in Chinese as juyu wang, generally link judges within a
particular court; in some more developed areas they link lower courts with higher
courts. In some respects internal networks provide similar types of information
and opportunities for interaction that are provided on the external internet: judges
have easier access to laws and regulations and some selected cases than in the past,
and in some courts can share their views about cases with other judges in
chatrooms. Internal networks, like the external web, make it easier for judges to
do their jobs.
Yet the information on such sites is limited to that selected by court
officials, and thus is often far less comprehensive than what is available on the
external internet. Judges using internal networks are limited to seeing those
materials that their superiors want them to see. In addition, internal networks are
also an important mechanism for monitoring work by individual judges. In this
177

http://blog.chinacourt.org/wp-profile1.php?cat=3&author=5008.
http://blog.chinacourt.org/wp-profile1.php?cat=3&author=529.
179
One exception is an interview with us about our research in Procuratorate Daily, one of
China’s leading legal newspapers. Liu Hui, Meiguo “Zhongguo Fa Yanjiu” Xuezhe Tan -- Hulian
Wang Dui Faguan Ji Fazhi De Yingxiang [American “Chinese Legal Research” Scholars Discuss
-- The Impact of the Internet on Judges and the Rule of Law], JIANCHA RIBAO [PROCURATORATE
DAILY], July 24, 2006, available at http://www.jcrb.com/n1/jcrb1004/ca530254.htm.
178
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respect courts’ use of the internet may be seen as a parable for China’s embrace of
the internet more generally: more information is available, and judges are able to
do their jobs more efficiently (and, one hopes, more fairly), but the internet is also
serving the state’s interests in imposing oversight and control.
In a 2002 notice, the SPC instructed all courts in China to set up networks
or individual computers with software allowing allow judges to search laws and
other legal materials.180 Courts have gradually complied with the notice. Reports
in 2003 and 2004 on the development of the internet in China’s courts stated that
500-600 of China’s approximately 4,000 courts had established internal
networks.181 Many more courts appear to have set up internal networks since then,
or are in the process of doing so.
Discussions of the role of internal networks focus on their role in making
courts more efficient. Thus, for example, reports have noted that developing
internal networks raises court efficiency by strengthening information
management and “leadership methods” in the courts.182 Reports have also noted
the importance of court networks in facilitating supervision of lower courts by
higher courts.183
180

Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Yinfa “Renmin Fayuan Jisuanji Xinxi Wangluo Xitong Jianshe
Guanli Guiding” He “Renmin Fayuan Jisuanji Xinxi Wangluo Xitong Jianshe Guihua” De
Tongzhi [The Supreme People’s Court Notice on Printing and Circulating the “Regulation on the
Administration of the Establishment of the People’s Court Computer Information Network
System” and the “Plan for Establishing the People’s Court Computer Information Network
System”],
Jan.
29,
2002,
available
at
http://www.yfzs.gov.cn/gb/info/LawData/flfg2002/gfsfjs/2003-02/19/1518560846.html
[LZ-6]
(stating that all courts should establish internal court networks in order to improve management of
cases and case statistics; in theory the networks should connect provincial courts to the SPC). In
2002, the SPC instructed all provincial high courts and intermediate courts to establish court
networks by 2003 and to link such networks to the SPC’s network, and instructed all local courts
generally to establish court networks by 2005. Id. [LZ-6] The SPC does not appear to have made
public more recent data on progress toward meeting such goals.
181
Renmin Fayuan Xinxi Wangluo Xitong Jianshe Jishu Guifan Tushu Neirong Jianjie [Brief
Introduction to Technology Criteria for the Establishment of the People’s Court Information
Network System], available at http://www.law-lib.com/shopping/shopview_p.asp?id=11349 (last
visited Sept. 26, 2005) [LP-48]; Quanguo Fayuan Xitong Yiji Zhuanwang Shipin Huiyi Xitong De
Guihua Yu Jianshe [Plan and Construction of the National Courts’ First Level Special Network
Video Conference System], ZHONGGUO DUOMEITI SHIXUN [CHINA MULTIMEDIA VIDEO
COMMUNICATIONS], March 5, 2004, http://www.cmvc.com.cn/list.asp?id=338 [LP-50].
182
Brief Introduction to the Technical Criteria for the Establishment of the People’s Court
Information Network System [LP-48], supra note 181; Plan and Construction of the National
Courts’ First Level Special Network Video Conference System [LP-50], supra note 181; see also
Hanbin Fayuan Jiancheng Jisuanji Juyu Wang [Hanbin Court Establishes Internal Network],
RENMIN
FAYUAN
BAO
[PEOPLE’S
COURT
NEWS],
May
10,
2003,
http://rmfyb.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=49783 (stating that the presence of a court
network improves efficiency and quality of the court) [LP-16]; Laishan Juyu Wang Wei Shenpan
Tisu [Laishan Internal Network Expedites Trials], RENMIN FAYUAN BAO [PEOPLE’S COURT NEWS],
Mar. 27, 2002, http://rmfyb.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=35107 (noting how a court
network has improved efficiency) [LP-18].
183
See, e.g., Pei Cong, Lasa Shi Chengguan Qu Renmin Fayuan Juyuwang Jianshe Tongguo
Yanshou [Lhasa Chengguan District People’s Court Internal Network Construction Passes
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Not surprisingly, courts in economically developed areas have taken the
lead in developing such networks.184 In Jiangsu Province -- one of China’s richest
-- a 2006 report noted that computer networks had been established in 116 of the
province’s 123 courts. 185 Yet courts in less developed areas -- ranging from
Heilongjiang in the northeast to Tibet -- have also developed court networks and
have publicized their use in increasing both efficiency in and supervision over
local courts.186
Many basic level courts, in particular in rural areas or county towns, lack
networks -- or computers. 187 Judges at a rural county court in Jilin Province
reported that the only people in the court with web access are the court president
and the vice-presidents; judges have no access to either an internal network or to
the external web. 188 Only court leaders have computers. 189 Judges at both a
county and an intermediate court in the central province of Hubei commented that
they lack any web access, and that many courts lack computers.

Inspection], ZHONGGUO XIZANG FAYUAN WANG [CHINA TIBET COURT WEB], Aug. 15, 2005,
http://tibet.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=506 [LP-5] (noting the important role internal
networks play in facilitating lower courts’ reporting to higher courts).
184
The 2003 SPC notice instructing courts to provide networks or computers on which judges
could search for laws and other relevant materials stated that the costs of such infrastructure
should be borne by individual courts. See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Bangong Ting Guayu Tuiguang
Peibei “Zhongguo Shenpan Falü Yingyong Zhichi Xitong” De Tongzhi [SPC Office Notice on
Promoting and Furnishing the “China Adjudication Law Application Support System”], Nov. 4,
2003, available at http://www.courtpress.com/subject/s1.php [LP 3].
185
Fenli Tuidong Quansheng Fayuan Gongzuo Xin Fazhan [Pushing for the New Development of
All Courts in the Province], JIANGSU FAZHI BAO [JIANGSU LEGAL NEWS], Feb. 15, 2006, available
at http://www.jsfy.gov.cn/fydt/fyyw/fyyw_esw1.htm [LZ-1]; Sheng Fayuan Jianjie [Brief
Introduction to the Courts in the Province], JIANGSU FAYUAN WANG [JIANGSU COURT WEB],
www.jscourt.gov.cn/fyjj/index.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2006) [LZ-2].
186
Xinxihua Jigou [Informationized Institutions], Heilongjiang Sheng Xinxi Zhongxin
[Heilongjiang Province Information Center], http://www.hljic.gov.cn/xxhsd/xxhjg27.asp (last
visited Aug. 25, 2005) [LP-4] (discussing the establishment of internal court networks in sixty
courts in Heilongjiang Province, and noting the role of the provincial high court in inspecting and
overseeing internal networks in lower courts); Pei Cong [LP-5], supra note 183 (discussing the
establishment of an internal network at a district court in Lhasa, the first in the Tibet Autonomous
Region, and emphasizing the importance of the network in managing the acceptance, adjudication,
and enforcement of court opinions); see also Hainan High Court Constructs New Working
Platform Hand in Hand with Cisco [LP-6], supra note 161(stating that all courts in Hainan
Province have been equipped with internal networks). In some areas court networks connect
higher courts with lower courts under their jurisdiction, although this appears to be primarily the
case in more developed areas. In Changchun, for example, the intermediate court is linked via an
internal network to both the provincial high court and to lower courts. Interview 2005-70;
Interview 2005-84. In Xi’an, however, as of mid-2005 the intermediate court’s network was
separate from and not connected to the internal networks at lower courts. Interview 2005-10.
187
Interview 2005-9.
188
Interview 2005-95.
189
Interview 2005-95; see also Interview 2005-83 (stating that in many rural courts in Jilin there is
only one computer for each court, and there is often no internal network); see also Interview 200518 (stating that some local courts in Xi’an lack the resources to provide computers for all judges).
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In general, internal networks have four primary functions. First, they
provide searchable databases of laws, regulations, some cases, and other binding
normative documents. Many courts include a database of national and local laws
developed by conjunction with the Supreme People’s Court, the People’s Court
Press, and the Chinalawinfo Center at Peking University. 190 The database
includes SPC interpretations, replies, and other documents, as well as some
cases.191 Internal networks thus provide judges with electronic forms of the types
of materials they have traditionally consulted in deciding cases, making it easier
for judges to access such materials.192 Judges also receive information about new
laws, regulations, and interpretations via notices on their internal court
networks. 193 Over time, how, why, and by whom the information included in
internal webs is collected may have a major impact on how courts function and
apply the law. Controlling information on internal networks -- which the SPC is
doing by requiring all courts to use standardized software -- is also a mechanism
for controlling how judges decide cases.
Second, some court internal networks include discussion forums in which
judges discuss topics ranging from new cases to the quality of food in the court
cafeteria.194 These forums are similar to those that exist on the external web, but
are accessible only to judges from a particular court or courts. In some courts
judges comment that such discussion forums are rarely used to discuss substantive
matters.195 In others, however, such as in Jiangsu Province, judges say that such
internal discussion forums -- which are accessible to most judges in the province 190

“Zhongguo Shenpan Falü Yingyong Zhichi Xitong” Zhengding Dan [“China Judicial Law
Application Support System” Order Invitation Form], Renmin Fayuan Chubanshe [The People’s
Court Press], http://www.courtpress.com/subject/index_5.php (last visited Sept. 26, 2005) [LP 49];
Interview 2005-18; see also Interview 2005-55 (stating that the legal materials available on
internal sites is purchased from the SPC). In 2003 the SPC issued a notice instructing all courts to
purchase a database of laws produced by the People’s Court Press. Zuigao Renmin Fayuan
Bangong Ting Guayu Tuiguang Peibei “Zhongguo Shenpan Falü Yingyong Zhichi Xitong” De
Tongzhi [SPC Office Notice on Promoting and Furnishing the “China Judicial Law Application
Support System”], Nov. 4, 2003, available at http://www.courtpress.com/subject/s1.php (last
visited Aug. 25, 2005) [LP-3]. It is not clear, however, what percentage of courts have actually
done so. According to one report, the database is in use in all courts in Beijing, Shanghai, Fujian,
and Guangxi; in another fourteen provinces it is used by some courts. Relie Zhuhe “Zhongguo
Shenpan Falü Yingyong Zhichi Xitong” Ronghuo “Di San Jie Guojia Dianzi Chubanwu Jiang”
[Warm Congratulations for the “China Adjudication Law Application Support System” Winning
the
“Third
National
Electronic
Publications
Awards”],
http://chinalawinfo.com/ad/courtpress/index.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2006) [LZ-28].
191
Interview 2005-10; Interview 2005-12; Interview 2005-13; Interview 2005-18.
192
Interview 2005-63.
193
Interview 2005-70.
194
See. e.g., Yuhuan Renda Zong Di 194 Qi [Yuhuan People’s Congress Issue General No. 194],
Aug. 9, 2005, http://www.yuhuanrd.gov.cn/news_show.php?show_id=986 (emphasizing the use
of an internal court network for judges to exchange views with each other and with the court vice
presidents responsible for their division of the court) [LP-2].
195
See, e.g., Interview 2005-79 (stating that court chatroom is rarely used); Interview 2005-65
(stating that judges in Shenyang rarely use the internal BBS); Interview 2005-102 (stating that
Beijing judges rarely use their discussion forums to discuss cases).
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- have become important forums for discussing new legal issues and, in some
cases, pending cases. 196 The system includes numerous discussion forums,
moderated by individual judges, where judges can discuss cases (and other issues)
anonymously.197 One judge noted that the forums allow judges to learn about
new developments, both in China and overseas. 198 Likewise, all judges in
Shanghai can participate anonymously in discussions on the Shanghai court web,
which links all courts in the city. 199 In addition, the Shanghai Second
Intermediate People’s Court’s internal network includes a section in which judges
can discuss “difficult legal questions” that they encounter in cases. The
discussion is also accessible to judges in lower courts under the intermediate
court’s jurisdiction. A report on the court’s website stated that court officers can
discuss abstract legal issues encountered in individual cases. The court also
organized a team of experienced judges to provide information in response to
such abstract questions.200
As we have noted, Chinese judges frequently discuss cases that are under
consideration with their peers and superiors, including superiors in higher courts.
Discussing pending cases on discussion forums is thus an electronic version of the
forums of vertical consultation that already exist. Yet such discussion forums
may also facilitate debate that judges might be less willing to engage in face to
face with other judges or with their superiors. For example, one report on the Liu
Yong case 201 recounted how judges on the Liaoning Province High People’s
Court had discussed the case on their internet network while it was under
consideration -- but did so anonymously out of concern for retribution.202 Yet
such discussion nevertheless takes place in a controlled environment, one in
which only court personnel participate, and one that is monitored by court
superiors. It may be that judges are more willing to participate in such
196

Interview 2005-63.
Interview 2005-58; see also Interview 2005-70 (stating that judges in Changchun will
sometimes discuss difficult cases on discussion forums on their internal network, but generally
only after the case has been decided).
198
Interview 2005-58; Interview 2005-77.
199
Interview 2006-57; Interview 2006-76
200
Faguan Shenpan Anjian Yudao Nanti, Fayuan Wangzhan Tigong Yantao Kongjian [When
Judges Encounter Difficult Questions in Adjudicating Cases: Court Website Offers Discussion
Space], SHANGHAI QINGNIAN BAO [SHANGHAI YOUTH DAILY], Apr. 7, 2005, available at
http://legal.people.com.cn/GB/42734/43194/3302092.html [LP-22].
All responses must be
approved by the intermediate court’s research office; the intermediate court will not respond to
questions that reveal facts relating to individual cases. Interview 2006-45. Judges in other areas
likewise state that they will sometimes use the internal web to discuss pending cases, in particular
in courts where every judge has his or her own computer. Interview 2005-83.
201
See supra.
202
Zhang Yue, Panjueshu Gaige Licu Touming Shenpan, Faguan Dulixing Youdai Tigao [Court
Opinion Reform Advances Judicial Transparency, Independence of Judges Needs to be Enhanced],
LIAOWANG DONGFANG ZHOUKAN, [ORIENTAL OUTLOOK], July 6, 2005, available at
http://www.chinajudge.com/ReadNews.asp?NewsID=3267&BigClassID=17&SmallClassID=25&SpecialID=0 [LP7].
197
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discussions when they know they are not open to the public. Yet judges may also
be wary of speaking too freely in a system run by the courts with an explicit goal
of boosting oversight over judges.
Third, internal networks serve to disseminate information to judges, in
particular about recent court developments. Internal web sites sometimes include
representative cases from provincial or municipal high courts, as well as notices
and interpretations from such courts. 203 Local court leaders also sometimes
include specific materials or cases from their own court on their internal web
sites.204 These materials are designed to inform and educate judges; such cases
are often selected because they either are particularly good examples, and are thus
worthy of study, or carry a particular message.205 Thus, for example, in Beijing,
courts can view interpretations from the Beijing High People’s Court, as well as
those from the Supreme People’s Court. The Beijing High Court posts
descriptions of important decisions (but not court decisions themselves) on its
internal web site for judges in the city to review.206
Fourth, and arguably most importantly, internal networks facilitate
oversight over individual judges and even courts. In many cases it appears that
the networks have become a significant mechanism for higher–ranking judges to
monitor the work of those below them. In so doing, internal networks reinforce
the hierarchical and bureaucratic structure of China’s courts. Many internal court
networks provide information regarding the status of cases, such as party names,
dates on which cases were filed or dates of scheduled hearings, and whether a
case has been resolved. In most cases, such information is available only to
judges handling such cases and their superiors,207 although in some courts all
judges can view such information. 208 In others, however, such information is
available only to court superiors: judges complain of being required to enter
extensive administrative information regarding cases into the computer system,
but note that they themselves cannot access such information. The monitoring
function is backed-up by other technology. In some courts in Beijing and
Shanghai, court presidents, vice-presidents, and heads of individual divisions can
203

Interview 2005-70 (stating that in Changchun, the internal network at the intermediate court
includes internal notices and announcements to judges, as well as a database of laws); see also
Interview 2005-104 (stating that court networks are used to distribute notices and other
information to all judges in Beijing); Luzhou Zhongyuan Juyuwang Shang Kai Luntan [Luzhou
Intermediate Court Opens Forum on Internal Network], RENMIN FAYUAN BAO [PEOPLE’S COURT
NEWS], June 21, 2004, http://rmfyb.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=70984 [LP-14] (noting the
usefulness of a court internal network for disseminating notices and other information to judges).
204
Interview 2005-10.
205
Interview 2005-77 (stating that internal web sites also sometimes include descriptions of cases
or opinions in selected cases that court education and propaganda officials have decided to post).
206
Interview 2005-58.
207
Interview 2005-12; Interview 2005-63.
208
Interview 2005-49; see Fayuan Ban’an Liucheng Guanli Xitong [Administrative System for
Court Proceedings], http://www.spsp.com.cn/chinese/products/chanpcx_dzzw_fy01.htm (last
visited Aug. 25, 2005) (noting the use of court networks to improve management of case
information) [LP-10].

11/10/06 Draft

CHINA’S NETWORK JUSTICE

46

watch live video streams of the proceedings in any courtroom under their
jurisdiction.209 At the Supreme People’s Court, all judges are required to log in to
the court network as soon as they get to the court, so that superiors can monitor
who has arrived at work.210
Court judgments are likewise usually available only to a limited number of
judges and court officials. In a few courts it appears that all judges with access to
the internal network can view all or most decisions from their own courts,211 but
most networks only allow court leaders to view decisions (other than those
selected by court propaganda officials as worthy of posting on the network).212
As one court president explained, decisions are not made generally available on
the internal web site because they are “secret.”213 Thus court presidents and vice
presidents often can view all cases in their courts, and heads of divisions within
courts can view decisions in their division, but ordinary judges have access only
to only those cases they have decided.214 As one judge in an intermediate court
put it, each judge in the court is allowed to view different information depending
on his or her status. 215 In addition, in some jurisdictions in which networks
connect lower and higher courts, some higher court judges are able to view
decisions in lower courts in their jurisdiction.216
In Beijing, for example, only high-ranking judges can view decisions. The
situation in Beijing is noteworthy in part because it marks a departure from the
more open system that was in place when the Beijing courts first created an
internal court network. At the time, judges could view all cases decided by any
court in Beijing.217 Judges could also view cases in their own courts in which
they were not involved.218 The Beijing High People’s Court altered the system,
creating instead a system that permits only higher-ranking judges to access such
209

Interview 2005-48; Interview 2005-58; Interview 2006-36; Interview 2006-76; see also Luzhou
Intermediate Court Opens Forum on its Internal Network [LP-14].
210
Interview 2005-103; see also Yuhuan People’s Congress Issue General No. 194 [LP-2].
211
Interview 2005-9 (stating that at one intermediate court in Qinghai judges at the court can use
the court’s internal network to view all cases decided at the court); Interview 2005-65 (stating that
judges in one court in Shenyang may view judgments in already decided cases on the court’s
internal web site).
212
Interview 2005-49 (stating that although individual judges may be able to access certain
information regarding cases not before them in their court or division within the court -- such as
the date of such cases and the names of parties -- they do not have the ability to access opinions);
Interview 2006-76 (stating that only senior judges can view decisions).
213
Interview 2005-12; see also Interview 2005-18 (stating that the internal website of an
intermediate case in Shaanxi includes no cases).
214
Interview 2005-70; Interview 2005-47; Interview 2005-48. In practice, this may not be a
significant bar to judges obtaining information: judges seeking information about previously
decided cases can also obtain information by asking their colleagues. Id.; Interview 2005-102
(stating that judges can ask their division heads if they want to see additional materials).
215
Interview 2006-76.
216
Interview 2005-47 (stating that in some courts in Beijing the court network allows both higherranking judges and judges at the Beijing High People’s Court to view decisions from lower courts).
217
Interview 2005-49.
218
Interview 2005-47.
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information.219 The progression in Beijing appears to represent a more general
trend. As court networks have developed, courts have become more sophisticated
about both the type information provided, and the degree to which higher-ranking
judges are able to use the system as a tool for oversight.
It would be wrong to view efforts to use technology to improve oversight
over judges as entirely pernicious. As we have noted, there are many problems in
China’s courts -- including corruption, incompetence, and other forms of
malfeasance. If internal networks are able to ensure that cases are heard and
decided on time -- within the time limits stipulated in law -- that would be a major
step forward for the fairness of the Chinese system. The same is true with having
live images of court proceedings available to court superiors: the fact proceedings
are on camera may reduce incentives to engage in obvious misconduct. In this
regard, however, the development of court internal networks reflects the
development of the internet in China more generally. Restricted access to the
internet serves the state’s interests in oversight and control. But restricted access
may be better than no access, and in the legal system it may mean courts that
function more fairly, more efficiently, and more consistently.
III. JUDICIAL COMMUNICATIONS AND JUDICIAL POWER
What is the relationship between how a judiciary communicates and its
position in society? What can we learn from the Chinese example about the
relationship between judicial communications, judicial power, and the rule of law?
We suggest a central and important tradeoff for the Chinese or any legal
system in a cheap speech environment. First, in a country with a weak judiciary,
the ease of criticism made possible by cheap communications technology can
pose a serious threat to the legitimacy and power of the courts, and threaten
progress toward the rule of law. In more developed legal systems, where the
judiciary is stronger, such effects may be weaker, and the salutary aspects of
criticism more obvious.
However, in countries with less developed legal
institutions, the power of mass, directed, and cheap criticism to weaken judicial
institutions is much clearer.
The criticism born of greater informational freedom can correct injustice,
prevent corruption, and otherwise ensure a more fair legal system. But at the
same time it can also destroy what little power and autonomy weak courts may
have. Where the courts lack authority, the media and courts may become rival
institutions, set on a course of repeated conflict. That is what we have seen in
China, where courts and the media each contend that their view of the law and the
facts is the correct one, and where each claims that the other is beset by corruption
and incompetence.
But the same cheap communications can also be used to build judicial
power. The easier it is for judges to communicate, the easier to develop a
219

Interview 2005-47; Interview 2005-58 (stating that the heads of court divisions can view case
details of cases in lower courts).
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consistent set of rules across the country. Cheaper communications make it easier
for courts to apply the law consistently -- a major and often (at least in western
writing on Chinese law) overlooked problem.220 That, in turn, gives judges the
power to appeal to the potent principle that similar cases should be decided
similarly. Stated differently, we suggest here that judicial “herding,” while
considered dangerous by some of the American literature, 221 may be a key
component of constructing judicial power.
Horizontal networking among judges also makes it easier for judges to
cumulatively improve the law -- by passing on best practices to others. It also
facilitates the development of professional identity, which may be key to
developing the ability to resist external pressure. Those improvements will
further strengthen judicial claims to legitimate resolution of cases.
A. Judicial Power
The source of judicial legitimacy and power presents one of the oldest
questions in law and political science. What gives courts their political power?
The question is not easy to answer. The judiciary, whether in China or other
countries, typically lacks either the legitimacy of an elected body,222 or command
of coercive physical force (an army) to enforce its will. The judiciary’s power to
make others obey must derive from an appeal to some other source of authority
and legitimacy. Invariably judges lay claim to be enforcing some higher principle
that transcends the case before the judge.223 The exact principle may vary across
cases, legal systems, and eras. A judge may claim to be effectuating the
commands of the legislature, deciding the case the same as a similar case,
enforcing basic principles of morality, or perhaps implementing a divine will.
The strength of those claims will vary across time and among places. But what
these claims have in common is an appeal to an authority beyond the personal
discretion of the judge, and a hope that, thanks to the claim, the judge’s decision
will be obeyed.
From this perspective, a judiciary’s power can be said to stem from
several social facts. The first is how broadly any given principle the judiciary
220

For discussions of inconsistent application of law, see, e.g., Zhang Weiping, Minshi Susong
Falü Shen De Gongneng Ji Gouzao [The Function and Structure of Legal Hearings in Civil
Litigation], 5 FAXUE YANJIU [CHINESE JOURNAL OF LAW] (2005), available at
http://www.civillaw.com.cn/weizhang/default.asp?id=22910 [LZ-22]; Yu Dongai, Panli Fa Zhidu?
Panli Zhidu?: Yige Si Shi Er Fei de Sifa Wenti [Precedent Legal System? Precedent System?: A
Specious
Judicial
Question],
GONGFA
PINGLUN
[PUBLIC
LAW
FORUM],http://www.gongfa.com/yudapanlifa.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2006) [LZ-23].
221
See supra, text accompanying notes __-__.
222
In the United States the majority of judges are elected. However, most powerful judges,
including all federal judges, are generally appointed.
223
This argument is made in many forms in many places. See, e.g., James Bradley Thayer, The
Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893);
Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959);
ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
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might rely upon is accepted, both by other parts of government, who may have to
enforce the ruling, and by the public at large, who comply voluntarily. A second
consideration is, even granting the existence of accepted principles, the capacity
of the judiciary to assert the claims in the first place, a question that may depend
on access to resources. For example, a judge who lacks the relevant statute
books will have trouble claiming, as a matter of principle, that she is faithfully
implementing the will of the legislature.
Let us turn to the Chinese example, where the courts are weak, both
constitutionally and in actual practice, and discuss what makes their claims to
higher principle difficult. Among the simplest claims of principle a court can
make is that it is obeying the written law. Yet even that most basic claim is
complicated by the vagueness and confusion in many Chinese laws, and by
overlapping claims to authority by various Party-state institutions. Meanwhile,
courts in poorer areas sometimes lack basic legal texts, let alone internet access.
Similarly, judges, especially in rural areas, may lack the legal training necessary
to articulate their claims to legitimacy.224
Second, as we’ve already discussed, courts in China have been isolated
and largely unaware of what other, similar courts are doing. This deprives the
courts of another of the most obvious principles from which they can claim
legitimacy: doing what other courts have done. The decisions made by Chinese
courts, consequently, have lacked the consistency that might form the basis for a
claim to legitimacy and fairness.
Without recourse to these more obvious claims to legitimacy, a popular
default, as other Chinese scholars have noted, is for Chinese courts to make the
claim to be effectuating the will of the Party.225 However, the relatively unclear
legitimacy of the Party itself, along with the Party’s control over the courts,
means that the authority that may be derived from such claims may be weak. In
practice, it appears that injustice in individual cases, and inconsistent application
of the law, are widely viewed as undermining popular confidence in the courts.
What our study adds to this discussion of judicial power is a new
appreciation of how judicial communications may affect the claims to authority
that judges may make.
Cheaper communications can both weaken and
strengthen judicial power.
B. Net Justice

224

See Yao Xiang Jiejue Tuoqian Jiaoyu Jingfei Nayang Jiejue Hao Faguan Gongzi Zu’e Fafang
Wenti [Resolve the Problem of Full Payment of Judge’s Salary in the Way that Late Payment of
Education Funding is Resolved], ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG [CHINA COURT WEB], July 1, 2004,
http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=121608 [LZ-21] (reporting official comments on
the poor conditions and low salaries in local courts); Liebman, Restricted Reform, supra note 35
(discussing inequalities among courts in China).
225
See Liebman, Restricted Reform, supra note 35 (discussing court commitments to “socialist
rule of law” theory and to maintaining social stability).
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The blogger theory discussed in Part I makes the classic point that cheaper
speech ought to improve government performance. Much of the argument is a
high-tech version of the classic view of free speech presented by John Stuart Mill
in On Liberty, suggesting the now seemingly obvious merits of having orthodoxy
challenged by heretical opinion.226 In its high-tech manifestation, the idea is that
the government will commit a given number of wrongful acts. Due to resource
limits and agenda, traditional media will only expose a percentage of these errors.
In theory, the sheer increase in the number of critics empowered by internet
technology will lead to more government misdeeds being uncovered -- in the
sense that a nation equipped with more fly-swatters will kill more flies.
Writers like Thomas Friedman and Nicolas Kristof rely on blogger theory
and predict that in authoritarian regimes such as China, cheap speech ought
similarly improve government performance -- or even lead to the downfall of such
regimes. Whether that is actually happening or not is the subject of an ongoing
debate. Both of us, in other work, have discussed this subject, emphasizing a loss
of specific control yet a maintenance of overall control over political debate
within China. 227 More wrongs are being exposed in China, but this does not
necessarily mean the Communist Party is any less in control than in the past.
What we have learned in this study sheds further light on this debate.
Blogger theory prizes criticism as a remedy for bad governance, which means the
cheaper it is to criticize the better. This study shows the limits of these views -and urges a better understanding of the role of cheap internet criticism. We
uncover the problems of directed criticism, in particular attacks on a weak
judiciary in an environment where criticism of other government actors is more
effectively barred.
An important assumption of the classic free speech theory discussed above
is that the government actors in question are powerful enough that criticism will,
in the end, improve performance. Yet matters may be different when some but
not other forms of criticism are allowed, and when the criticized actors are weak
and face ongoing legitimacy problems. In that context, the public criticism that
cheaper speech makes possible can erode the ability of judges to act, in effect, as
judges. It can weaken their capacity to act independent of public and political
opinion, and weaken the courts relative to other political actors.
We have seen in this paper that criticism of the judiciary helps maintain
the power of the Communist Party. Net-fueled rage provides new reasons and
justifications for the Party-state to intervene in the operation of the legal system.
While sometimes the Party-state will prop up, as oppose to reverse, a judge’s
decisions, either way, it is the Party-state, and not the courts, that has the final say.
Whatever legal authority might have existed is replaced with a political decision
made by the Party-state. This creates incentives for the public and the media to
appeal to Party-state actors to intervene in cases with which they disagree. It also

226
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See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY, Ch. 2 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1975).
See Liebman, Watchdog, supra; Wu, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET, supra.
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encourages courts to align their decisions with what they believe will be Party
leaders’ views.
For judges, political intervention can be embarrassing, and carries the risk
of more serious sanctions if decisions are viewed as incorrect by court or Party
superiors. In China, in politicized or sensitive cases, the threat of political
intervention has always been a check on the power of the courts. Preordained
outcomes and Party intervention have long been a feature of the Chinese legal
system. The new concern, however, is a type of political pressure that is born not
of the narrow political or financial concerns of the Party or of individual Party
officials, but the broader set of issues likely to inflame public opinion. What’s
new is the possibility of intervention not only for politically sensitive cases, but
for simply unpopular decisions.
At its worst, cheap mass criticism may lead to a legal system where Net
reaction serves as a kind of alternative appellate review. The case of Liu Yong’s
execution comes closest to that extreme, one that Chinese commentators have
compared to the court-free mass justice of the Cultural Revolution. But more
ominous still are the cases like Liu Yong’s that never come to light, because the
courts do not dare practice leniency for fear of the public reaction.
Courts have several means of trying to avoid such interventions, but most
lead in unfortunate directions. First, courts facing cheap mass criticism have
every reason to try and prevent the media and internet sites from stirring up
controversy. The result is the spread of false or controlled transparency in
China’s courts. The courts, as we are seeing, have used new technology and the
commercialization of the media to spread positive reports about their own
work.228 They are also making it harder for journalists to cover court proceedings.
The emphasis China’s courts have put on managing media relations and the flow
of information to the media in recent years reflects both the power of the Chinese
media and the internet, and judges’ beliefs that media intervention in cases is
often illegitimate and unhelpful. The courts thus are now trying to exert more
influence on the media, much as the media have tried to influence the courts.
Second, given that courts cannot always control media coverage, courts
have an incentive to try and decide cases in a manner least likely to inflame public
opinion or attract media attention. As we’ve said, the real question is how often
courts fail to decide cases like the Liu Yong case for fear of public outcry. It
goes without saying that such self-conscious efforts to avoid unpopular decisions
are a far cry from deciding cases fairly.229 Instead, the courts may engage (like
the media itself) in a judicial version of a self-censorship -- or make a deliberate
effort to guess what outcomes the media or ultimately the Party might prefer.
228

Cf. Ni Shouming Jiyu Benwang Jiaqiang Guanli Jiji Fa Zhan [Ni Shouming Sends Words to
Our Web: Enhance Management and Positively Develop], Hebei Sheng Gu’an Xian Remin
Fayuan [Hebei Province Gu’an County People’s Court], Mar. 31, 2005,
http://gaxfy.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=94 (court official discussing importance of the
internet) [LZ-65].
229
Interview 2005-10.
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What we are saying can be misinterpreted as suggesting that a judiciary is
better off absent any external criticism. First, none of this to suggest that there is
no positive side to the new criticisms of China’s courts. The optimistic face of
Web justice is (half) of the Sun Zhigang case, where public attention demanded
government reform, or the Nie and She cases, where internet coverage helped to
pressure the SPC to revise procedures for capital cases. We do not advocate
further restrictions on speech in China. The problem is not with the courts or the
media, but rather lies in hypersensitivity to public option and concerns regarding
“social stability” among Party officials, and a resulting unwillingness to refrain
from intervening when law and public opinion conflict.
***
The points discussed here have obvious implications for other developing
countries, as well as for legal systems with more robust courts. The blogger
theories developed in the West have their limits, particularly when the
development of the judiciary is at issue. In many developing countries with weak
judiciaries, it must be understood that cheap mass criticism of the courts alone
may hinder, rather than aid, the development of an independent judiciary. The
case of China shows how important it is for media to respect a judiciary’s role in
society, and for courts and other state institutions to be able to resist the
temptation to yield to public rage. The spectacle of the Internet manhunt as a kind
of appellate court of public opinion may have reached an extreme form in China.
Yet no legal system can afford to ignore similar dangers.
This discussion also highlights a crucial difference between cheap speech
and free speech. Many observers of China mistake the present volume of speech
(cheap speech) as reflecting an inevitable trend toward free speech, when the two
are distinct. Speech may be cheaper in the new China but at the same time only
modestly freer, for while the volume of criticism may be growing, much is in
permitted directions. The media has some freedom to incite virulent public
attacks on the judiciary (cheap speech), but not to question the legitimacy of
Communist Party rule (free speech). Indeed, the very fact that there remain
significant restrictions on speech may be what makes permitted forms of criticism
so extreme. That is why when we warn of the dangers of cheap speech to the
power of the Chinese judiciary, we are not discounting the value of free speech in
the political system. We claim only that cheapening speech along one dimension
-- mass criticism of an already weak judiciary -- may not be a healthy
development.
C. Judicial Networks
Cheap speech may make it easier to ignite populist campaigns against the
judiciary. But the flip side is that it also makes it easier for judges to learn about
and rely on each other’s decisions -- giving a new basis for claims to legitimacy
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and authority. Judges who are aware of the decisions of others may make claim
to a central principle: that like cases be decided alike. There is obviously far
more to a legal system than the “like cases” principle. Nonetheless, the idea that
if a case is not different in relevant particulars from a case already decided it
should be decided in the same manner is an important starting point.230 It can be
alternatively termed a matter of human liberty,231 or the predictability of outcomes
for parties who live under the system.
The recent American literature on judicial precedent cascades, discussed
in Part I, has largely warned of the dangers of blind obedience to the decisions of
other judges. Our study leads us to a conclusion that is nearly the opposite:
imitative behavior may be a crucial route for the Chinese courts to develop their
power and autonomy. We argue here that the rise of horizontal communications
within the judiciary may slowly give individual judges and courts more
confidence in their decisions, as they create more uniformity and consistency
within their courts and across the country.
What happens when it gets easier and cheaper for judges to know what
similarly situated judges are doing or have done? 232 A judge now has a new
source of (external) information, namely, the decisions made by other judges who
faced the same problem.233 This setting -- a set of sequential and similar decision
makers facing a similar problem with imperfect information — contains the basic
components of the main economic models of herding behavior.234 And given
basic assumptions, the prediction is that judges, like any other actors, will
rationally value the information on what other decision-makers did in similar
circumstances, or at least count it in addition to local information. 235 Even
without a binding rule of stare decisis,236 we might expect the knowledge of what
other judges have done to have an effect on judicial decision-making. This is a
complex way of saying that judges will value the acts of other judges as a source
of information as to the right decision.237 As Professor Eric Talley writes, as
230

See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 176-224 (1986); MELVIN EISENBERG, THE
NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 10-12 n.29 (1988); ROBIN WEST, RE-IMAGINING JUSTICE:
PROGRESSIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF FORMAL EQUALITY, RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 107
(2003).
231
See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY A JUSTICE, 55-56, 210-213 (1972).
232
By assumption, the “other judges” are not superior courts or in any kind of vertical relationship,
but equals or higher–ranking courts in other jurisdictions whose decisions are not formally binding
in any way.
233
The idea of such a change in technology is not far-fetched -- as various historians have pointed
out, the common-law system may have only begun to function well after the invention of the
printing press, which offered, among other things, a cheaper means of finding out what other
judges had done in similar circumstances.
234
See, e.g., Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer & Welch, supra note 31; A. Banerjee, A Simple Model of
Herd Behavior, 107 Q. J. ECON. 797 (1992).
235
See Daughety & Reinganum, supra note 32; Talley, supra note 34, at 87.
236
Cf. Lewis Kornhauser, An Economic Perspective on Stare Decisis, 65 KENT CHICAGO L. REV.
63 (1989).
237
A number of writers in information economics discuss why decision-makers (usually in
financial markets) will rationally place weight on the decisions made by others in similar
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judges “learn information from previous holdings, they may rationally begin to
treat such holdings as binding on them, even if not formally required to do so, and
even if the case they actually hear suggests a contrary outcome.”238
Most of the American literature on herding and the judiciary presents the
possibility of precendential cascades as a threat to the legal system. The argument
is that judges may begin to blindly obey what others have done with little regard
as to the correctness of the rule adopted. Yet whether this is really a problem
depends on the legal system under study. Where consistency and a basic rule of
law are taken for granted, herd behavior may be a problem. But where the
judiciary is weak, and its decisions inconsistent, herding may be an important
political strategy. Our theory suggests that information about similar cases -even if not acknowledged as precedent -- may make it easier for courts elsewhere
to reach similar decisions. The greater availability of information and debate may
also make it more likely that courts in different areas of China will apply the law
consistently. Courts are increasingly looking for guidance horizontally, to equallevel courts in other jurisdictions, rather than only looking to their vertical
superiors. The fact that judges are increasingly looking horizontally to each other
also suggests the possibility of ground up development of law and courts, greater
expansion of court autonomy, and perhaps increased professional identity among
judges. All of these may over time encourage courts to further develop their own
ability to resist external pressure.
We can present this discussion a different way. As we discussed above,
the legitimacy and power of courts stems in part from their adherence to higher or
neutral principles. 239 In a mature legal system, it can be easier to find such
principles, whether they be the “rule of clear mistake” allowing the judiciary to
correct obvious errors made by the legislature and executive, the principle that
like cases be treated alike, or some other principle. Yet in a developing legal
system the search for such rules may be more difficult. That is why the simplest
principle of all -- acting as other courts or judges have done -- is so important.
Lacking any other particular claim to legitimacy, the judge may at least say that
the court is acting in a manner consistent with what other courts have done.
situations. One reason is the possibility that the earlier actors knew something -- among Choice A
and B, they possessed private insight or information suggesting that Choice A was preferable. A
second is simply a preference for conformity -- that most people prefer to do what others have
done, either because it reduces mental strain, protects their reputation, or avoids the risk of being
criticized. For these and other reasons, see Bikhchandani et al., supra note 31. An important
point is that we might expect imitation both in the absence or presence of a formal precedent
system. For one thing, production of rules is part of the business of the judiciary -- so that a judge
who does what others have done might be a good judge. Another reason is that judicial power
may also be maximized by consistency among judges -- a united front that deters political
meddling. Third, and maybe the most important for most judges, following may just be easier.
It is much easier for judges to do what others have done -- in jargon, it minimizes decision costs.
238
Talley, supra note 34, at 94. Talley goes on to specify some of the ways that a legal system can
mitigate some of the negative side-effects of precedential cascades -- which we discuss below.
239
Along with, as Alexander Bickel argued, the power to avoid making decisions. See BICKEL,
supra note 223, at 49-65, 111-199.
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Courts and legal systems that treat like cases alike would appear both more
deserving of and more likely to receive public trust.
A further component of the advantages of judicial networking for judges is
the possibility of innovation toward better rules. In a world where judicial
communication is difficult, an innovative decision -- either a novel resolution of
an unclear legal issue, or a decision that appears to challenge existing laws or
norms -- often went unnoticed. Today, some such cases become lively topics of
debate online -- allowing both lawyers and judges elsewhere to become aware of
such decisions.240 Courts may be more willing to innovate when they know that
courts elsewhere in China have done the same. And to the extent judicial
networks improve the law in ways that prove popular, judges may lay claim to
greater authority and prestige.
The implications of this China-focused discussion for the rest of the world
should be clear. Empirically, scholars like Anne-Marie Slaughter have
documented the rise of cross-border contacts and networking among judges.241
Slaughter’s work on judicial networks describes the increasing practice of judges
in different countries paying attention to each other, and each other’s decisions, in
a way that is influential despite being non-binding. What courts in both
international and Chinese judicial networks are seeking is the same. They seek
the additional power and legitimacy that is the product of judicial conformity.
That judges in China and around the world should both seek the comfort of
reliance on what other courts have done should be no surprise.
We close this discussion with three caveats. First, our findings are
predictive rather than conclusive: we are suggesting that horizontal networking by
Chinese judges presents one possible route to strengthening the position of
China’s courts within the existing political system. Second, the position of courts
in Chinese society is the product of many factors, most importantly Party-state
policy. Third, the interviews conducted for this article do not permit overly broad
conclusions regarding how many judges use the internet, or the degree to which
such use of the internet is fostering informal precedent. Certainly not all judges
go online; those who do so tend to be younger, educated, and accustomed to using
computers. Many judges in China’s courts are older, and many older judges had
no formal higher education prior to joining the courts. One judge noted that only
those judges who are “responsible” will bother to conduct online research. 242
Another judge stated that those judges who do have internet access are more
likely to use the internet to play online games than they are to conduct legal
research.243 Despite these caveats, we are confident that changes in how judges
communicate will, over the long-term, affect the operation of the Chinese legal
system.
240

For a discussion of innovation in the Chinese system, see Liebman, Innovation through
Intimidation, supra note 35; Liebman, Restricted Reform, supra note 35.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The dramatic drop in the costs of communications represented by the
internet revolution has had effects on the world both predictable and
unpredictable. In North America, Japan, and Europe, it is the media and
entertainment industries that have faced the most radical challenges. But it stands
to reason that not every country will change in the same ways. In China, this
study shows that the legal system is one area where changing informational
practices seem to be having long-term transformative effects, with important
lessons for the rest of the world.
The perennial question is whether China’s internet revolution is
facilitating the “rule of law.” We see mixed results. At its best, judicial
networking may strengthen the confidence and autonomy of individual judges, as
they network with their peers. Net justice may also be used as a corrective
against judicial malfeasance and corruption. But as for the delicate issue of
external, political scrutiny of judges, matters may be getting worse before they
start getting better. As one of us has noted elsewhere, at the end of the day raising
the status and authority of courts is not something courts can do on their own.244
The central Party-state does not appear interested in fundamental changes to the
power of the courts. What is emerging, however, is a new and confusing dynamic
between a commercial media, better trained judges who are beginning to aspire to
the roles played by judges elsewhere, Party-state officials, and a reactive public.
We do not claim to understand the full implications of that dynamic for the rule of
law in China.
The case study of China yields important lessons for the legal systems in
developing and developed countries.
Every country has a de facto speech
environment surrounding its judiciary -- a mixture of informal and formal rules
that control how judges speak, and how people speak about judges. What we
learn from the study of China is how vital these speech practices can be for a
healthy and fair legal system. The speech norms by which a judiciary lives by
may be vital to its power, and their erosion cannot be taken lightly.
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Liebman, Restricted Reform, supra note 35.

